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Abstract  
The current thesis attempts to address an existing gap in the academic literature on the 
potential role of remittances in reducing gender inequality in migrants’ countries of 
origin with the use of quantitative methods.  
Theoretical framework is built on scholarly explanations of the reasons preventing 
women from achieving equal status with men in the present age and the review of the 
existing research on the relationship between remittances and gender equality. Here the 
paper presents opposing views on potentially positive and negative effects of 
remittances on gender equality in remittance-receiving countries. Based on this 
discussion the hypothesis being tested is that remittances contribute to reducing gender 
inequality in migrants’ countries of origin and that this effect is more profound in the 
long term. To test whether this assumption holds, the study relies on fixed effects 
regression model that involves remittances per capita and Gender Inequality Index as 
independent and dependent variables respectively. The data used is time-series-cross-
sectional data on 141 countries for a period of 1995-2012 coming from World Bank, 
UNDP and Quality of Government Institute. The obtained results support the research 
hypothesis that the higher the level of remittances in receiving countries is, the lower 
the level of Gender Inequality Index is, and that the effect of remittances is greater in 
the long-run.  
The main contribution of the thesis is that it is likely to be the first study that examines 
the relationship between remittances and gender inequality with the use of TSCS 
analysis involving the wide range of countries over relatively extended period of time. 
Key words: gender inequality, gender equality, gender gap, remittances, migrants, 
patriarchy, discrimination 
Word count: 11 186 words 
  
The thesis is a part of my Master’s degree studies at the University of Gothenburg thanks to a 
Swedish Institute scholarship. 
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Introduction 
In 2013 migrant remittances amounted to 404 billion US dollars and represented the 
second largest source of external funding for developing countries (WDI 2014, World 
Bank). It is widely recognized now that in this capacity remittances play a crucial 
role not only in lifting households out of poverty and contributing to local 
community development, but in building a social capital as well which is 
manifested in “forming long-distance social links of solidarity, reciprocity and 
obligation” between migrants and families left behind (Ramirez et al., 2005: 13). 
Academic and policy-making circles generally agree that migration and remittances 
represent a transformative force enhancing processes of economic, cultural and 
social change (De Haas, 2007: 2).  
As social dynamics of globalization and migration is changing, gender roles are also 
changing – in households, labor markets and community networks. Remittances as 
carriers of social capital are believed to transform family gender roles, elevate 
women’s disadvantaged position in society and contribute to reducing gender 
inequality. The latter still persists in most countries of the world and is manifested 
in women’s underrepresentation in political ranks, their lack of access to economic 
resources and education, prevalence of women in lower-paid and lower-status 
employment, gender wage gaps within the same job title and qualifications, 
women’s greater housework and childcare responsibilities (Jackson, 1998: 11).  
It is often hypothesized that women are likely to be empowered by remittances as 
they assume additional roles in addition to their traditional ones.  It is suggested 
that women’s increasing role in both sending remittances from abroad and 
receiving remittances from their spouses might serve as an engine for shift in 
gendered power relations by giving them more economic independence, inclusion 
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in the labour market, decision-making power, emancipation and individual self-
esteem. 
 Feminist scholars and think-tanks emphasize the need to incorporate women’s 
needs and gender perspectives at the core of international migration agenda. 
However there is not enough research produced yet to explain whether and how 
women are empowered by being either senders or recipients of remittances (UN-
INSTRAW Report, 2006).  The existing academic works on the topic employed mainly 
qualitative research for producing country-case study reports that are very valuable in 
terms of empirical evidence and findings, however the scope of the conducted 
observations are limited in terms of time and country cases.  
In an attempt to partially address this research gap this course paper is aimed to 
explore the role of remittances in reducing gender inequality in migrants’ countries 
of origin.  
The paper is organized as follows: first, I look at the reasons why gender inequality 
still persists in modern times, and then review the existing main literature on 
relation between remittances and gender equality. Based on the theoretical 
discussion I generate my hypotheses and research questions. The data and 
methodological framework are described in the third section. In the fourth section I 
present the results by using TSCS regression analysis that as we see confirms my 
hypothesis that remittances do contribute to reducing gender inequality. My 
conclusions are summarized in the fifth section.  
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1. Theoretical framework 
1.1. The reasons of persistence of gender inequality in modern times  
For the most part of human history since the emergence of settled agricultural 
communities and early states, male domination has determined gender relations. 
Even in the first half of the 20th century men and women were considered to have 
different and opposing roles in the society: woman’s role was being a wife and 
mother, and man’s was being a breadwinner. Men had institutionalized support for 
their privileged position and lawful authority over their wives and kids since “the 
legitimacy of patriarchy was taken for granted by most people and backed by religious 
doctrines that saw these relations as ordained by God” (Wright & Rogers, 2011).  
Gender relations experienced one of the most rapid and profound transformation in 
the last two centuries. In the second half of the 20th century women’s visibility in the 
labour market, political scene and educational institutions increased dramatically. 
Women achieved legal equality in most countries of the world, however the total 
equality in reality is still a distant dream. Despite all the changing modern practices 
and development programs meant to help women to elevate their disadvantaged 
position, gender inequality still persists to varying degrees in all countries of the 
world regardless of their eminent differences in culture and social structure 
(Jackson, excerpts from “Down So Long”, not yet published). Men and women tend to 
receive different treatment which is often endorsed by custom and law in many 
countries of the world (Kinias & Kim, 2012: 90).  There is a wide range of factors that 
keep preventing women from achieving equality with men.  
Before discussing how remittances might serve as one of the contributing factors in 
reducing gender inequality, we first need to understand the reasons why gender 
inequality still persists nowadays. The reasons of persistence of gender inequality 
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are presented in general terms. In some instances some women might have a higher 
status and a wider set of privileges than some men. However generally, the reasons 
discussed here are applicable to most countries of the world to varying extent 
regardless of their geographic location and economic development.   
We know that gender inequality took its origins in the ancient primitive societies as 
a result of social organization based on biological differences. But transformation 
and recreation of new forms of gender inequality is explained by “the opportunities 
available for men to acquire an advantaged position in the new order based on their 
ascendancy in the old” (Jackson, ibid). Though some norms are resistant to change, 
now “they exist in a completely different context of cultural norms, political and social 
rights, and institutionalized rules” (Wright & Rogers, 2011). 
Nowadays gender inequality is defined as “an ordinal hierarchy  between the 
average man and woman in valued resources, in power, and in status”  (Ridgeway, 
2011:10). This is manifested in women’s underrepresentation in political ranks, lack 
of access to economic resources and education, prevalence of women in lower-paid 
and lower-status employment, gender wage gaps within the same job title and 
qualifications, women’s greater housework and childcare responsibilities, the 
higher value attached to men’s activities in general, and the lack of state policies 
supporting dual-earner couples (Jackson, 1998: 11).  
The main reason behind the existing gender inequality is gender’s firmly implanted 
role as “an organizing force in social relations” (Ridgeway, 2006: 267). Gerda Lerner, 
one of the founding scholars of the academic field on women’s history, stated that 
women's subordination is not natural or biological, but rather a historical result “which 
has been primarily expressed in the form of paternalistic dominance within the 
structure of the family” (Lerner, 1986: 241). Men and women’s perceptions of gender 
roles are central in explaining how family, as a primary social institution, enhances 
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men’s supremacy and women’s subordination in the wider society (Kane and Sanchez, 
1994: 1080).  
Whatever the historical roots of sex- and gender-categorization, may it be 
heterosexuality and reproduction, it tends to frame social relations because it rests on 
conventional beliefs that delineate the characteristic differences between “typical 
males” and “typical females” and the manner they are expected to act.  Because gender 
stereotypes imply not only difference, but status hierarchy as well, it causes inequality 
which “carries sex and gender far beyond home, reproduction and the family” and 
“embeds gender in positional inequalities in political, economic, social as well as 
familial institutions”.  The gender stereotypes also assign each group a set of specialized 
skills. Those assigned to women have more to do with “feminine tasks”, and are less 
valued in general than those granted to men. Men in general are viewed more 
“competent” and “agentic” (Ridgeway, 2006: 268-270).  
These beliefs account for discrimination in the labor market as a result of employers’ 
preference for employees of certain sex depending on the type of job.  This is why men 
prevail in high-managerial positions, most prestigious professions in science, industry 
and information technologies, while women dominate in less popular professions like 
nursing, teaching, clerical positions, retail sales and services. This also explains, but 
does not justify the existing wage gap when female employees are paid less for the 
same type of job than their male counterparts of the same qualification (England, 2006: 
247).  In times of economic recession women often find themselves to be victims of 
discrimination as they are the first to be fired due to reluctance of the employers to keep 
the personnel who require maternity leaves and flexible working hours (Durbin and 
Fleetwood, 2010: 225). Discrimination in the labour market is also manifested in 
employers’ reluctance to invest in women’s skills or education since they are expected 
to take maternity leave at least once throughout their career in general. It also makes 
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women hesitant to invest in the education required for specific skills-type of job since 
these are likely to be interrupted due to their child-rearing obligations. This is another 
factor contributing to persistence of gender-segregated jobs (Iversen & Rosenbluth, 2010: 
111).  
The said gender attitudes also shape the political participation of women. Women are 
politically underrepresented to varying degrees across the globe. Female politicians are 
not trusted by voters because of the deep-rooted stereotype about being a “weaker sex” 
incapable of rational decision-making (Shvedova, 2002: 10). General hostility towards 
female politicians accounts for women’s lack of confidence and political ambition. 
(Lawless and Fox, 2012: 4) Women’s large absence from political scene means that 
policies of country-wide importance and issues of resource allocation are usually 
decided without input from women whose life priorities might shape different 
perspectives on community’s needs and interests from that of men (WEF 2007: 4).  
Education is an important factor promoting gender equality. It provides a strong 
incentive for women to question traditional gender hierarchy and increase their 
economic and political participation. In this regard existing gender inequality in 
education is another obstacle preventing women from approaching closer to parity with 
men.  While the gap in primary education has been narrowed in most countries of the 
world by reaching almost the universal level of attainment except for Sub-Saharan 
Africa and South Asia, the level of enrollment into secondary education is different 
across the regions. In Middle, Eastern and Western Africa, South Asia and Middle East, 
the drop-out rate of girls from secondary education is higher, while in OECD countries 
it is higher among young boys. (OECD, 2012: 36).  
In the societies where the drop-out rates of girls from secondary schools are high, it is 
believed that schooling of females is a waste of resources since they are likely to marry 
and join another family household. Even in many Western countries where women 
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prevail in tertiary education, the economic returns of acquiring skills are still higher for 
men. Males with higher degrees of educational attainment tend to advance on the social 
ladder on two dimensions – gender and class, while even highly educated females often 
improve only on one dimension – class, i.e. they “remain subordinated within the 
system of gender stratification, despite the fact that they may enter a more dominant 
economic position” (Kane, 1995: 79). 
As mentioned earlier women made a big step towards closer parity with men in the 
last decades.  However the “gender change is still asymmetric in two ways”: relations 
transformed more in the labor market than in the household. While women are much 
more active in the paid employment, ”men’s participation in performing traditionally 
female duties is still very limited by comparison” (England, 2006: 245).  
 Domestic chains tying women to child-rearing and household functions have been 
essentially limiting their advancement and liberation. The disproportionate 
responsibility of women over childcare robs them of control over their time and 
freedom since they rarely can expect their husbands to sacrifice their own time or career 
for these activities (Jackson, excerpts from “Down So Long”, not yet published). Even 
employed women, often combine their paid full-time or part-time job with unpaid 
domestic job and as a result end up with a “double burden” (Durbin and Fleetwood, 2010: 
p.226) 
The gender attitudes would not have persisted if both parties involved were not 
conforming to them. Many of the gender stereotypes are “consensual” in the sense 
that people recognize and follow them as “the social rules of the game by which 
others judge” and treat them regardless of whether they themselves ”endorse” or 
agree with them. It is suggested that “the assumption that others hold a stereotype 
has a substantial impact on the likelihood that individuals act, or refrain from acting, in 
accord with that stereotype” (Ridgeway, 2006: 280). Women’s conformity to these beliefs 
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often explained by their economic, interpersonal, intimate and emotional dependence 
on men (Kane, 1998: 613). There is a big fraction of family-oriented women whose 
pulling out from the labor market due to household obligations contributes to 
persistence of gender gaps (Escriche, 2007: 838). Women’s resistance to their 
underprivileged conditions within the family depends a lot on their own labor force 
participation, educational level and marital status (Kane, 1998: 630).  
The gender parity cannot be achieved without transforming household division of 
labour within the family (Wright and Rogers, 2011). Until that happens “gender 
inequality in the labor market will persist even if discrimination in hiring and 
promotion disappears entirely” (Ridgeway, 2006: 282).  For this to happen there should 
be more institutional support from the states allowing for parental leaves and childcare 
options for both parents (Durbin and Fleetwood, 2010: p.226).  
 
1.2. Literature review on the link between remittances and gender equality in 
migrants’ countries of origin 
 
It is mostly agreed now that “migration is profoundly gendered process” and that 
gender affects the reasons forcing people to migrate, their access to resources and 
decision-making power relationships within their families (Kanaiaupuni, 2000: 1). 
However gender in this capacity not only shapes movement of human resources across 
national borders, but transforms gender relations within transnational contexts (Ramirez 
et al., 2005: 35). Gender roles are changing as a result – in the family households, the 
communities and the workplace. Remittances, defined by IMF as “household income 
from foreign economies arising mainly from the temporary or permanent movement of 
people to those economies” (BPM6, 2009:272), represent the second largest source of 
external funding for developing countries, and as such are recognized as being of great 
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importance in reducing household poverty, enhancing local development, fostering 
social change (Lopez-Ekra et al., 2011: 69) and in shifting from traditional patriarchy to 
increasing egalitarianism (UN-INSTRAW, 2007: 2). It is suggested that “traditionally 
with less access to resources and less decision-making power than men, women can be 
empowered by migration and remittances”, and “as economic decision-makers, they are 
emerging from the margins as key players in the migration equation” (IOM, 2002: 2). 
The literature on the impacts of migration and remittances on sending societies is quite 
limited and the existing research often disregards the gender dimension (De Haas, 
2007:19). In this regard, “remittances that women send and manage are a key in 
understanding the changes in the balance of power within patriarchal unequal 
households   and evaluating the processes of the following social transformation” 
(Ramirez et al., 2005: 35).   
Some studies argue that sending and receiving remittances allows gradual 
delineation of gendered boundaries and consequent empowerment of women in 
societies of origin (Ramirez et al., 2005: 34). International Organization for Migration 
stands by the idea that women are likely to be empowered by remittances as they 
assume additional roles in addition to their traditional ones.  It is suggested that 
women’s increasing role in both sending remittances from abroad and receiving 
remittances in their home countries might serve as an engine for shift in gendered 
power relations by giving them more economic independence, inclusion in the 
labour market, decision-making power, emancipation and individual self-esteem. 
Women remitting money to their husbands who are left behind in their home-countries 
may gain a new breadwinning role for their families, while women receiving 
remittances from their husbands working abroad may gain more responsibility and 
freedom in managing the funds and running the household (IOM, 2010: 5). 
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The transforming power of remittances comes not only from monetary flows. It 
involves other intangible factors as well. Sørensen describes these elements as “social 
remittances” which entail ideas, practices, identities and social capital that flow from 
migrants’ host societies to migrants’ societies of origin. Both female and male migrants 
are carriers of social remittances in person or through different means of 
communication. In this capacity social remittances have a power to transform 
traditional family roles and behaviours (Sørensen, 2004: 5).  Through acquiring new 
roles, women also transmit new images of women’s capabilities, challenge the ideas of 
being subordinate to men, and as a result have a potentially positive effect on gender 
roles in the community left behind (Lopez-Ekra et al., 2011: 71). 
A number of scholars suppose that the effect of remittances on empowering women is 
more apparent when it is the case of women who act as remitters. It is assumed that 
apart from gaining a new breadwinning role for their families left behind, female 
migrants tend to adopt the receiving country’s societal norms of gender relations (Lopez-
Ekra et al., 2011: 70). Since labour migration happens normally from less developed to 
more developed economies with higher gender equality, migrant women are likely to 
adopt more egalitarian practices. Curran (2003) and Ramirez (2005) provide another 
argument in favour of positive effect of remittances coming from female migrants on 
women empowerment in countries of origin based on the empirical research in 
Southeast Asia. In the absence of wives, husbands left behind in the households tend to 
perform more domestic work to replace for the absence of their migrant wives which 
further transforms the gendered division of labour in the household (Curran, 2003: 49; 
Ramirez, 2005: 39).  
De Haas suggests that the effect of remittances is not always structural, but it has the 
capacity to form long-term intergenerational benefits. For example, the monetary flows 
sent by remitting women can have a positive impact on the educational attainment of 
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younger girls in the family and as a result more active participation in the labour 
market and personal fulfillment. Earlier empirical research findings (obtained by 
different groups of researchers independently from each other) from Morocco (1996), 
Mexico (2002), El Salvador (2003), Philippines (2004), Nepal (2005) Guatemala (2006) 
confirm that a significant share of international remittances sent by mothers is allocated 
on children’s schooling which positively affects secondary retention rates. The 
quantitative findings in El Salvador by Edwards and Ureta (2003) suggest that the 
positive effect of remittances on attaining education in urban areas was ten times higher 
than the effect of any other income. This long-term investment in education of children 
is especially important in terms of human development opportunities for girls in the 
future (De Haas, 2007:23).  
 Guzman et al. (2007: 127) tends to agree by enclosing the results of empirical research 
from a few African countries that highlight that female migrant tend to invest more into 
health and education of the younger generation of women in the household.  
Taylor et al. (2006) as referred by de Haas after examining the remitting patterns in 
Guatemala adds an argument that remittances are capable of causing change in 
traditional gender attitudes within the family and society, but this process if likely to be 
long-term since social relations in general resist rapid change (De Haas 2007:23).  
In the case of men who migrate and send remittances from abroad to their wives left at 
home, it is assumed that it promotes the independent decision-making of women in 
terms of management of resources and running the household needs (De Haas, 2007: 
20). In addition to running businesses in their husbands’ absence, wives left at home 
may have to represent the household in the social events taking place in the wider 
community. In some societies, this may challenge the traditional norms regarding 
women’s freedom of movement outside the house (Ramirez et al. 2005). This may entail 
more public involvement, social activism and local political participation that give 
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women more opportunities for expressing their voices on socially important matters 
(Curran et al., 2003).  
Apart from the potential positive effects of remittances on women’s empowerment 
discussed above, there are also some beliefs supported by empirical research about zero 
power of remittances (Lopez-Ekra et al., 2011: 71). De Haas (2007) referring to some other 
research reports on Turkey (1997),  Morocco (2000), Albania (2006), Burkina Faso (2006) 
suggests that remittances in some cases do not lead to a permanent shift in the gender 
roles. Although the migrants’ wives receiving remittances enjoy more autonomy and 
decision-making while their husbands are abroad, this is believed to be mostly a 
temporary shift since migrants are expected to regain their authority as patriarchal 
heads of the households once they return home (De Haas (2007: 20).  
Lopez-Ekra et al. (2011) hypothesizes that sometimes remittances might be reproducing 
gender roles.  In the case of female migration, men’s dependence on remittances sent by 
their wives, might force them to increase their participation in domestic work and 
childcare. But in this case they are still likely to resort to the help of other female family 
members. The latter are often grandmothers or older daughters.  For daughters 
mothers’ absence might lead to negative consequences in terms of physical fatigue and 
missed educational and human development opportunities (Lopez-Ekra et al., 2011: 75).  
Which of the assumptions discussed above are true is still a subject for debate in the 
existing research.  In my analytical chapter I test some of these assumptions, i.e. how 
remittances contribute to reducing gender inequality in general, how they affect young 
girls’ secondary educational attainment, women’s labour force participation and 
political activity, and also what is the long-term effect of remittances.  
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 1.3. Research questions and hypotheses 
Based on the above theoretical discussion the general research questions that this paper 
aims to answer are the following: “Do remittances affect gender inequality in receiving 
countries?” “If so, do they contribute to reducing gender inequality in migrants’ countries of 
origin?  
In an attempt to answer these questions the research paper aims to test the following 
hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 0 (H0): There is no relationship between remittances received and gender 
inequality levels in migrants countries of origin. 
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Remittances contribute to reducing gender inequality in migrants’ 
countries of origin.  
Hypothesis 2 (H2): The contribution of remittances in reducing gender inequality in 
migrants’ countries of origin is more profound in the long run.  
The remittances considered here are the total remittances sent by both male and female 
migrants to their households in home countries. Recipients of remittances could also be 
people of both sexes.  
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2. Methodological framework  
As a way to study the effect of remittances on gender inequality across a large number 
of countries and over multiple time periods, I regress Gender Inequality Index and its 
components on annual levels of personal remittances received per capita in monetary 
terms in TSCS data. Below I discuss the data and the methods employed.   
 
2.1. Data  
All the data used in this research paper comes from the World Bank, UNDP databanks 
and the Quality of Government Institute. My dataset includes 141 country groups with 
five-year interval observations over a period of 1995-2012.1 Overview of the variables 
and descriptive statistics is given in the appendix (table A1).   
Operationalization of Dependent Variable 
Gender Inequality Index (step 1) and its components (step 2).  
There are still essential data limitations when it comes to the choice of dimensions for a 
global measure of how women fare as opposed to men (Gaye et al.,2010:9). As my proxy 
for gender inequality I use Gender Inequality Index – a relatively new index which was 
introduced by UNDP only in 2010 as an improved alternative to Gender-related 
Development Index and Gender Empowerment Measure and designed to capture 
inequality in achievements between women and men in the following three dimensions: 
reproductive health, empowerment and labour market (FAQ: GII, UNDP). GII ranges 
from 0 (when women and men are fairly equal in these dimensions) to 1 (when 
women’s achievements in these dimensions fare poorly as opposed to men’s). GII’s 
composition is presented in the figure below.  
                                                          
1 Decided to include the most recent data as well which the is data for 2012 . Thus, the observed years are 
1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2012.  
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Figure 1. Gender Inequality Index: composition structure 2 
 
The dimension of reproductive health consists of two indicators: the UNDP adolescent 
fertility rate (births per 1,000 women aged 15-19) and the UNICEF maternal mortality 
ratio (maternal deaths per 100,000 live births among women aged 15-49). The ratio of 
women dying in childbirth could have been substantially reduced through the means of 
better education and healthcare. However this ratio is still very high in many countries 
because many women are denied access to these basic services due to their 
underprivileged economic and social status in the society. For the same reason of 
deficient female schooling the rate of teenage pregnancy and childbearing remains 
worrisome across the globe. Premature motherhood poses serious health threats to 
teenage girls, often hinders their further education and limits their employment 
opportunities in the future (Gaye et al.,2010:11). 
Two indices are used for calculation of the empowerment component of the GII: a 
percentage of the population aged 25 or older with at least some secondary education 
(UNESCO data) and a share of seats held by female in national parliament as measured 
                                                          
2 Source: Milorad Kovacevic, UNDP. Presentation of the Gender Inequality Index at Doha Conference 
May 9-11, 2011.  
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by Inter-Parliamentary Unit (HDR 2014:175). These two indices reflect the strength of 
the agency of women. Education, especially at post-secondary levels, brings 
empowerment to women because it gives them better access to information, strengthens 
their capacity to question, reflect and act on their own condition. The share of seats held 
by females in national parliaments reflects women’s visibility in political leadership, 
opportunity to be heard and advocate their interests in country-wide debates (Gaye et 
al., 2010:12). 
The remaining component of GII is a labour force participation rate defined by the 
International Labour Organization (ILO) as a share of a “country’s working-age 
population (aged 15 and older) that engages in the labour market, either by working or 
actively looking for work, expressed as a percentage of the working-age population” 
(HDR 2014:175). This indicator reveals the level of women’s employment or their efforts 
undertaken to get employed as opposed to men.  
GII is one of the newest indices, but it has its own limitations. It is often criticized for 
being not a real inequality index since it reflects gender aspects of Human Development 
Index (maternal mortality ratio and adolescent fertility rate), but does not capture 
women’s performance compared to men’s in other important dimensions like unpaid 
domestic work, availability of parental leave for both parents, wage gaps, 
unemployment and gender-segregated employment (Gaye et al.,2010; Kovacevic, 2011).  
Admitting that it is a big disadvantage of the index, I still have to rely on GII as a 
measure of gender inequality due to the lack of a better indicator.  The data availability 
is the major advantage of GII since it covers the broadest set of countries. It also reports 
on the proportion of women in parliaments, employment and secondary education 
which in my opinion are important proxies of gender (in)equality in their own right.  
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The following map shows performance of 152 countries based on their Gender 
Inequality Index values in 2013. The cross-country GII ranking list with numerical 
values is enclosed in the appendix as well.  
Map 1: Gender Inequality Index 2013 3 
 
The ranking reveals that Slovenia is the country with the lowest level of gender 
inequality (0.021), while Yemen is the country with the highest gender inequality (0.733) 
in 2013. The average GII for countries with very high human development is 0.197, 
while for countries with low human development it is 0.587. Women in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (0.575) are measured to be at a more disadvantage than women in other 
geographical regions. Three Scandinavian countries Sweden, Denmark and Norway are 
in the top 10 with 0.054, 0.056 and 0.068 values respectively (HDR 2014: 39,40).  
                                                          
3 The map has been created by myself via www.chartsbin.com based on the UNDP statistical data  (Human Development Report 
2014, http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/table-4-gender-inequality-index ) 
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Operationalization of Independent Variable  
Personal remittances per capita, received (current US$). The indicator is calculated by taking 
the existing World Bank estimates on remittances received annually in total by 
countries and dividing it by their population number. Given the large differences 
among observed countries in population size, remittances per capita seems to be a more 
appropriate measure than remittances received in total per country.   
My independent variable accounts for “household income from foreign economies 
arising mainly from the temporary or permanent movement of people to those 
economies” (WDI, 2014:92). This specification is based on a new definition of 
remittances introduced by IMF in its sixth edition of Balance of Payments Manual in 
2009.  
Personal remittances are qualified by IMF as the sum of “funds and noncash items sent 
or given by individuals who have migrated to a new economy and become residents 
there (private transfers), and the net compensation of border, seasonal, or other short-
term workers who are employed in an economy in which they are not residents” (gross 
compensation less taxes, social contributions paid by nonresident workers in the 
economy of employment, less transport and travel expenditures related to working 
abroad).  Net compensation of border, seasonal, or other short-term workers is 
calculated as a part of personal remittances since “it refers to the earnings of 
geographically mobile workers and benefits households in a territory other than that 
where the work is performed”.  In most cases short-term workers spent less of their 
income than resident migrants and thus more of their earnings are available for their 
households. They are also likely to maintain stronger economic and social ties with their 
countries of origin (BPM6, 2009:272-274; RCG, 2009:5).  
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One of main limitations of the data on remittances is probably the lack of total accuracy. 
No statistical data at the macro-level can be considered reliable. The data on remittances 
as admitted by IMF is probably one of the least reliable data in the balance of payment 
accounts.  Remittances are difficult to measure because of their heterogeneous nature. 
They normally involve numerous small transactions done by migrants through a wide 
variety of channels. The fact that in most of the instances they are sent undetected 
through informal channels makes them difficult to keep track on (RCG,2009:1-2). 
Another disadvantage of the data is the presence of a non-migrant related component:  
personal transfers classified into this category by IMF include all the individual 
transfers regardless of the source of income of sending residents, the relationship 
between residents of two countries, and the purpose of the transfer. (BPM6, 2009:273). I 
consider the IMF classification of remittances as an acceptable measure of migrant 
remittances in my research since the representation of non-migrant related items  in 
social transfers’ category might partially make up for the unreported remittances sent 
by migrants through informal channels.   
In this capacity remittances represent the second largest source of external funding for 
developing countries. In 2013 their flows totalled 404 billion US dollars (WDI 
2014:92). The largest recipient of remittances in the world is India followed by China, 
Philippines, Mexico and Nigeria. Being one of the hugest emerging markets, India’s 70 
billion US dollars in remittances were equivalent to 12 % of its import value in 2013. The 
biggest country-recipients of remittances in monetary terms and as a percentage of GDP 
are presented in a chart below.  
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Chart 1. Top 10 recipients of remittances 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Remittances received by smaller states tend to be equivalent to a larger portion of their 
GDP value (Migration and Development Brief 22, 2014:2,4).  
 
Control variables  
Three control variables have been added to test the validity of the chosen model.  I 
control for economic development, development aid and the level of globalization. 
These three are probably among the most frequent terms used in combination with 
gender inequality in the media and academic literature.  
As a proxy for economic development I use a standard measure – GDP per capita (in US 
dollars) extracted from the World Data Bank. It is a common belief that economic 
development is one of the factors contributing to rising gender equality. By providing 
more employment and earning opportunities to women, it is believed to increase their 
labour force participation, encourage their human capital development and boost their 
domestic bargaining power (Iversen and Rosenblutch, 2010; Eastin and Prakash, 2013).  
                                                          
4
 Migration and Development Brief 22, 2014, p. 2,4 
24 
 
Justification of official development assistance as another control variable stems from 
the fact that most of the initiatives aimed at promoting gender equality and women 
empowerment in developing countries are supported by the significant share of 
development aid. Gender perspectives have been incorporated into UN’s Millennium 
Development Goals, international agreements and other official agendas. By giving 
underprivileged women in developing countries better access to education and 
healthcare, foreign aid is believed to be capable of eliminating gender disparity (MDG, 
UNDP).  The consensus among the scholars about whether the impact of foreign aid on 
development in general, and on gender inequality in particular, is positive or negative 
is still to be reached. There are quantitative research studies supporting both. If not 
accompanied by structural reforms, the effect can be detrimental (Raghuram & 
Subramanian, 2005: 3). The increasing dependence on external funding might cause a 
poverty trap undermining women’s long-term human development opportunities (The 
Economist, 2001).  To test the relative impact of remittances (that is the second largest 
source of funding for developing countries) on GII, I think it is research-worthy to 
control for ODA which is another large source of inflows in developing countries since 
a big part of it is directed to promote gender equality. For this reason I include the 
World Bank data on ODA per capita as a second control variable.  
As the last control variable I employ the Index of Globalization (Dreher) provided by the 
Quality of Government Institute. The index includes three dimensions (political, 
economic and social) and measures the phenomenon that is witnessed by roughly every 
person on the planet. It is a dimension that affects all aspects of our life. The modern 
phenomenon that entails liberalization of physical and economic borders results in a 
higher mobility of economic and human resources, rapid diffusion of technologies, 
products, information and consumption patterns (IMF, 1999). Through the increased 
economic, cultural and social integration, globalization tends to transform social norms 
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and gender patterns as well. Through the expansion of multinational business activities 
and media outlets it opens new opportunities for women’s employment, education and 
social exchange (IMF, 1999). As a control variable it is likely to have a power to affect 
GII, so its addition into the model is needed to test the relationship between my main 
explanatory and outcome variables.  
 
2.2. Method  
The assumption regarding the relationship between my independent and 
dependent variables is that the higher the level of remittances per capita in 
countries of origin is, the lower GII in these countries is (i.e. closer to 0 when 
women and men are fairly equal). For my hypothesis to be true there should be 
negative relation between the level of remittances received and GII.  
To test this assumption this study relies on fixed effects time-series-cross-sectional 
(TSCS) regression analysis. The main advantage of using TSCS data as opposed to 
cross-section data is the feasibility of making repeated observations on fixed units, 
countries in my case, over extended period of time.  Because of the both time and space 
dimensions of TSCS data, implementation of ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation 
can be problematic due to frequent temporally and spatially correlated errors, as well as 
heteroscedasticity (Beck and Katz, 1995: 634). Unlike OLS method that disregards 
country-specific factors, fixed effects method considers the possibility that states “differ 
in ways not explained by observed independent variables” (Wilson and Butler, 2007: 
104). I do assume that there might be important unobserved country-specific factors 
correlated with the time-variant explanatory variables that I use in my model. For this 
reason I lean on the fixed effects method since it allows controlling these invariant 
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country-specific effects and potentially increases the accuracy of my results. The 
inclusion of fixed effects into linear regression has the following form:  
(1)       Yit = βXit + αi +µit                                                                                                             
In this equation Xit  and  Yit  stand for independent and dependent variables which in 
my case are remittances received per capita and gender inequality index for a country i 
in time period t. The αi is the country i-specific fixed effects and µit   denotes the error 
term for a county i in time period t.  
Due to introduction of GII only in 2010, the data for earlier periods is very limited. It is 
available from 1995 with 5 year-gaps that explains why I resort to 5-year interval 
observations in my analysis. However this technical limitation is not likely to be a big 
problem since it might help to solve a potential issue with ‘sluggish’ regressors. One of 
the shortcomings of fixed effect model is a potential presence of very slowly-changing 
independent variables. This might cause high standard errors because these slow 
predictors are likely to be highly collinear with fixed effects (Wilson and Butler, 2007: 
105). I assume that having 5-year interval observations in my fixed effects model might 
be a way to partially address this issue.   
The above equation (1) assumes the data comes from the same period. However not all 
relationships between predictors and dependent variables have this kind of 
instantaneous character. In many cases, especially when it comes to macroeconomic 
conditions, there is a time lapse between the resulting change in the dependent variable 
and the change in the explanatory variable (Studenmund, 2000:) If there is an effect of 
remittances on reducing gender inequality, I assume it grows over time. In the 
theoretical chapter I discussed the potential intergenerational benefits of remittances. It 
is likely to be more the next generation that gains from remittances since it takes time 
for gender attitudes change, for women to attain education and increase their labor 
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force and political participation, and for a quantitative indicator like GII to reflect these 
changes. I assume we should allow for a decade to pass before we can observe the 
reduction in gender inequality in response to the growth of GII. For this reason I lag my 
independent and control variables by 10 years. To avoid the emergence of missing 
values in the new model, I added the data on remittances for 2 earlier periods (1985, 
1990) in the dataset.  The updated model with the lagged independent variable is 
summarized in the following equation:  
(2)            Yit = βXit-10 + αi +µit                                                        
With inclusion of control variables the equation takes the following form:  
(3)         Yit = β1 Xmit-10 + β2 Xnit-10 + β3 Xsit-10 + β4 Xzit-10 + αi +µit, 
where Xmit-10 denotes the received remittances per capita in year t-10, Xnit-10 is a GDP 
per capita in year t-10 5,  Xsit-10 stands for development assistance per capita in year t-10 
and Xzit-10 is index of globalization in year t-10.  
Lagging independent variables serves another purpose as well. It eliminates the 
potential bias of reverse causality since the assumption that the present values of GII 
somehow affect the level of remittances received 10 years ago is not legitimate.  
Because of the aggregated nature of the gender inequality index (GII) that serves as my 
dependent variable I will use two-step analysis: first I will test the effect of remittances 
and control variables on GII, implement post-regression diagnostics and then examine 
the effect of remittances on each of the separate indicators used for calculation of GII. It 
means I will have 6 multivariate models with 6 dependent variables. Thus, Yit  in the 
equation (3)  alternates: it  signifies first GII, and then its components (maternal 
                                                          
5 I refer to the period that precedes 10 years (or 2 time periods) to the year of observation as t-10 just for 
visual clarity of the equations.  
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mortality ratio, adolescent fertility rate, female to male ratio with at least secondary 
education, share of parliamentary seats held by women and female to male labour force 
participation): 
(4)     GIIit = β1rem_capita it-10 + β2gdp_capita it-10 + β3oda_capita it-10 + β4globalisation+ αi +µit 
(5)     MMRit = β1rem_capita it-10 + β2gdp_capita it-10 + β3oda_capita it-10 + β4globalisation + αi +µit 
(6)     AFRit = β1rem_capita it-10 + β2gdp_capita it-10 + β3oda_capita it-10 + β4globalisation + αi +µit 
(7)     FEdit = β1rem_capita it-10 + β2gdp_capita it-10 + β3oda_capita it-10+ β4globalisation + αi +µit 
(8)     FParlit = β1rem_capita it-10 + β2gdp_capita it-10 + β3oda_capita it-10 + β4globalisation + αi +µit 
(9)    FEmplit = β1rem_capita it-10 + β2gdp_capita it-10 + β3oda_capita it-10 + β4globalisation + αi +µit 
To test if the error terms are correlated with the predicting variables and whether my 
fixed effects assumption holds, I will run Hausman specification test which requires 
pitting fixed effects against random effects. I will also check for outliers and highly 
influential observations to check for presence of extreme cases that potentially distort 
my results.  
All the statistical tests are run by using Stata 11.  
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3. Analysis and results  
3.1. Analysis  
As discussed in the previous chapter, I employ the TSCS fixed effects regressions and 
operate on predictors both with and without lag. To achieve normality of the 
distribution of my variables, all of the predictors have been log-transformed, however 
dependent variable has been left intact. Distribution of GII is not perfectly normal, but 
more ‘approximately asymmetric’ (when skewness is within the ± -0.5 range) with 
skewness being equal to 0.13 which is close to normal and with kurtosis (excess kurtosis 
as reported by Stata) being 0. Logarithmic and square-root transformations of GII did 
not yield better results, so I left my dependent variable untransformed assuming it to be 
normally distributed.  
The table below gives an overview of results for the regression analysis where the data 
on dependent and all independent variables comes from the same time period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.1. Fixed effects regression with instantaneous relationship between independent 
and dependent variables 
DV: Gender Inequality Index  Model 1 
β /se 
Model 2 
β /se 
Model 3 
β /se 
Model 4 
β /se 
IV: Remittances per capita(log-
transformed)  
-0.025*** 
(0.00) 
-0.005 
(0.00) 
-0.007* 
(0.00) 
-0.005 
(0.00) 
CV1: GDP per capita (log-
transformed) 
 -0.076*** 
(0.01) 
-0.082*** 
(0.01) 
-0.060*** 
(0.01) 
CV2: ODA per capita (log-
transformed)   
  -0.002 
(0.00) 
0.002 
(0.01) 
CV3: Index of globalization 
(log-transformed) 
   -0.122** 
(0.04) 
Constant (average value of the 
fixed effects) 
0.498*** 
(0.01) 
1.053*** 
(0.05) 
1.156*** 
(0.05) 
1.446*** 
(0.11) 
R-sqr 0.166 0.362 0.498 0.435 
Number of observations  551 548 362 276 
Number of countries 141 140 104 96 
Legend: *p<0.05,  ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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The first thing we notice via the obtained results is that the instantaneous effect of 
remittances on GII is not consistently significant. Standardized coefficient values for 
remittances are statistically significant at 0.000 and 0.041 levels in models 1 and 3. The 
negative sign of the coefficients supports my theory that the relationship between 
remittances and GII is negative: every increase in the log-transformed value of 
remittances by one unit results in the decrease in the gender inequality index by 0.025 
and 0.007 in the first and third models respectively. The lack of statistical significance of 
the remittances indicator in the rest two cases does not let us reject the null-hypothesis 
in these models.  
The instantaneous effect of GDP on GII, on the other hand, is highly significant in all 
three applicable models. The nature of this relationship is also negative: the higher level 
of GDP contributes to the lower level of gender inequality. Judging by the R-squared 
values the inclusion of GDP in the second model resulted in the noticeable increase of 
the explanatory power of the predictors in the GII’s variation from 16,6 % (Model 1) to 
36,2 % (Model 2).  
The character of relationship of the official development assistance and GII is not very 
clear: there is no consistency when it comes to coefficient signs. We can’t seriously 
discuss these results since they are statistically insignificant. But the presence of ODA in 
Model 3 resulted in the drop of the number of observations by 1/3, the statistical 
significance of the remittances’ estimate and the increase of explanatory power of the 
model up to almost 50 %.  It is also interesting that β-coefficients for remittances and 
GDP increased in absolute terms in Model 3. Does it suggest that remittances and GDP 
exert bigger influence on GII when supported by development aid projects? Not 
enough evidence to state that, but we’ll keep an eye on this relationship.    
Index of globalization is the last predictor that I included in the model. It appears to be 
the most powerful indicator as it owns the highest regression estimate in absolute 
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terms. One unit change in the log-transformed value of globalization index leads to the 
decrease of GII by 0.122 at 0.001 significance level. The presence of globalization index 
overshadows the rest predictors in the model: the β-coefficients of the other three 
predictors decreased, remittances lost their statistical significance again, explanatory 
power of the model also decreased since the value of the coefficient of determination (R-
squared) dropped from 49,8 % to 43.5 %.  It might partially have to do with the drop of 
the number of observations as well.  
The lack of consistent statistical significance of the remittances’ estimates might be 
explained, as we suggested earlier, with the likely non-instantaneous nature of the 
relationship between remittances and gender inequality index. It probably requires 
more time for the change in remittances to result in the change of GII.  To check the 
validity of this assumption, my next model examines the longer-term effect of 
predictors on the outcome variable. The regression statistics is summarized below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.2. Fixed effects regression with independent variables lagged by 10 years 
DV: Gender Inequality Index  Model  lag 1 
β /se 
Model  lag 2 
β /se 
Model  lag 3 
β /se 
Model  lag 4 
β /se 
IV: Remittances per capita, t-10 (log-
transformed)  
-0.022*** 
(0.00)  
-0.016*** 
(0.00) 
-0.021*** 
(0.00) 
-0.009** 
(0.00) 
CV1: GDP per capita, t-10 (log-transformed)  
-0.036*** 
(0.01)  
-0.035** 
(0.01) 
-0.005   
 (0.01)    
CV2: ODA per capita, t-10 (log-transformed)     
0.008 
(0.01)  
0.002  
(0.00)      
CV3: Index of globalization, t-10 (log-
transformed) 
 
 
   
 
-0.212*** 
(0.02)    
Constant (average value of the fixed effects) 
0.470*** 
(0.01) 
0.733*** 
(0.07) 
0.779*** 
(0.08) 
1.353*** 
(0.10) 
R-sqr 0.106  0.137 0.214   0.434    
Number of observations 485   482 335 323 
Number of countries 132 131 97 95 
       Legend: *p<0.05,  ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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The obtained results reveal statistically significant β-coefficients for remittances in all 
four models. It allows us to reject the null hypothesis about no relationship between 
remittances and GII. The consistently negative sign of the coefficients supports my 
hypothesis 1 that the relationship between remittances and GII is negative, i.e. the 
higher the level of remittances per capita is, the lower the level of gender inequality in 
migrants’ countries of origin is.  
It is also worth mentioning that apart from being statistically significant, the regression 
estimates for remittances resulting from the analysis with lagged predictors are higher 
in absolute terms than the estimates from the first analysis where the data comes from 
the same time period (except the first bivariate models). Judging by β-coefficients in the 
respective second and third models, remittances received 10 years ago have a three-
times-bigger effect on reducing gender inequality in quantitative terms than current 
remittances (-0.016 vs -0.005; -0.021 vs -0.007). In the fourth model the long-term effect 
of remittances is almost twice as big as the instantaneous one (-0.009 vs -0.005).   This 
data supports our research hypothesis 2 that the role of remittances in reducing gender 
inequality is more profound in the long-run.  
Standardized coefficients of the lagged GDP reveal that the long-term effect of GDP on 
gender inequality is weaker than the instantaneous one. Its β-coefficients decreased 
more than twice in the second and third models, and its significance is lost in the fourth 
model. In the last model the regression estimate is only -0.005, however because of the 
lack of statistical significance we don’t consider this value seriously.    
The β-coefficients for official development aid remain statistically insignificant. 
However the positive sign of the coefficients in both Models lag 3 and Model lag 4 
implies that the nature between these two variables has a potentially positive character. 
Despite the statistical insignificance and small quantitative value of ODA, its inclusion 
in the model strengthens the model since it results in the rise of β-coefficients of 
33 
 
remittances and GDP in absolute terms, and the increase of the explanatory power of 
the model from 13.7 % to 21.4 % .  
The inclusion of the index of globalization in the fourth model noticeably changes the 
picture. It remains to be the heaviest predictor in the model. Every change in log-
transformed globalization index by 1 unit results in the change of GII by 0.212.  The 
presence of this indicator essentially affects other predictors as well. Inclusion of this 
predictor takes away from the quantitative estimates of remittances and GDP. The lack 
of statistical significance of GDP, as well as ODA, leaves their values out of 
consideration.  But remittances sustain its statistical significance and negative β signs 
which is still an evidence that my research hypothesis holds ground. 
The fact that the explanatory power of the regression model with lagged predictors 
dropped in every case apart from the fourth one is interesting. Remittances as the only 
predictor accounts for 10.6 % of the variation in GII in Model lag 1 which is 6 % lower 
than 16.6 % in Model 1. Model lag 2 with remittances and GDP as regressors explains 
for 13.7 % of the variation in the GII as opposed to 36.2 % in model 2.  The drop is even 
more drastic in the third model where I introduce ODA as the third predictor: 21.4 % in 
Model lag 3 vs. 49.8 % in Model 3. Maybe it has to do with the fact that there are more 
factors affecting the outcome in the long run than in the present. On the other hand in 
the fourth models (Model 4 and Model lag 4) where the index of globalization is among 
the regressors, the values of R-squared are almost identical: 43.4 (Model lag 1) vs 43.5 
(Model 1). This leaves me questioning the reason behind it, however the results still 
support my two main hypotheses presented earlier in the paper: 1) that remittances 
contribute to reducing gender inequality and 2) that the effect is more profound in the 
long-run.  
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3.2. Post-regression diagnostics  
To check whether my fixed effects assumption holds, I run the Hausman specification 
test for the last model. The test allows to examine whether independent variables and 
fixed effects are correlated in the suggested model based on the difference between the 
fixed effects and random effects estimates. Since the difference of fixed effects from 
random effects model lies in the assumption that there is one true consistent effect size, 
a statistically significant difference between coefficients allows to reject the random 
effects assumption and gives support to fixed effects assumption (Wooldridge, 2009: 493). 
The test statistics is presented below.   
Table 3.3. Hausman test fixed effects vs random effects 
 
 
DV: GII 
Coefficients 
(b)           
 fixed      
(B)                 
random               
(b-B)      
Difference 
sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B))          
S.E. 
IV: Remittances per capita, t-10 
(log-transformed)  
-0.0092115     -0.0090291        -0.0001824         0.0017435 
CV1: GDP per capita, t-10 (log-
transformed) 
-0.004911     -0.0217915         0.0168805         0.0064312 
CV2: ODA per capita, t-10 (log-
transformed)   
 0.0020464      0.0016199         0.0004265         0.0021243 
CV3: Index of globalization, t-
10 (log-transformed) 
-0.2124632      -0.200498        -0.0119652         0.0075069 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg  
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
chi2(4) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B)  = 9.64 
Prob>chi2 =  0.0470 
Hausman test displays that the difference between fixed effects and random effects is 
statistically significant (‘Prob>chi2’<0.05) which indicates that my fixed affects 
assumption is valid.  
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While considering the validity of my regression model it is also important to test it for 
extreme observations that are potentially distorting my regression results. For this 
purpose I check for outliers, Cook’s distance and highly influential observations. Since 
Stata does now allow these options in panel data, I reinterpreted my fixed effects model 
with lagged predictors in OLS regression terms with the use of i.country option.  
First I try to identify the extreme observations visually by plotting leverages versus 
squared residuals. By revealing observations that have simultaneously high residual 
and large leverage this appears to be a way to identify both influential observations and 
outliers with one shot.  
Graph 1. Leverages-versus-squared-residuals plot 
 
The generated plot reveals that majority of the observations fall within the bottom left 
corner of the graph, however it also detects quite a number of observations that are 
likely to exert disproportionate influence on the whole model: observations with high 
residuals like China 2000, Laos 1995, Kyrgyzstan 2005, China 1995, Maldives 1995 and 
groups of observations with large leverage like Central African Republic 1995 and 
Albania 2005Albania 2010Albania 2012
Algeria 1995Algeria 2000Algeria 2005Algeria 2010l ri  12Argentina 1995rgentina 20r ti  01
Argentina 2012
rme i  r i  i 2
Azerbaijan 2012
Bangladesh 1995
Bangladesh 2005Bangladesh 2010l  2
Barb o  19 5
rbados 200
Barbados 2010
rbados 2012
Belize 1995
Belize 0li 5Belize 2012
Benin 1995
e in 200510
Bolivia 1995Bolivia 200Bolivi  5Boliv a 201olivia 2 2
Botswana 1995
Botswa 0otsw  2
razil 1995
razil 20az l 20051r il 
Burkina Faso 2012
Ca bodia 2005Ca bodia 2 102
Cameroon 99C mero n 2 12
Centr l African Republic 1995
Chile 1995hile 2000Chile 2010
China 1995
China 2000China 2005China 2 10
China 201olombia 1995l mbiColomb a 2 5C ombi  1l i 201
Co go 2000
o o 2 5
1Co o 20 2
Costa Rica 1995
sta Rica 2000sta Rica 2005
Cost  Rica 2010
te d'Ivoire 1995ote d'Ivoire 2 05te 'Ivoire 2010t  d'I ir  2
Croatia 2005
Cro ti  roati  12
yp us (1975-) 1995
D mi ic n Republic 1995D inic n Republic 2000i ic n epublic 2005o i ican epublic 2010D i  R li  2
Ecuador 20
Ecuad r 2 5Ecu or 201 1gypt 1995t 20 0y t 1
El Salvad r 1995
l S lvad r l l  v
Fiji 1995200
G bon 1995
Gabon 5
bon 2010
G bon 0
G orgi  2012
ha  1 9Gh na 20 5h  1
Guatemala 1995
u t mala 05u temala 201
Gu temala 2012
Guyana 2 05
GuyGuy
Haiti 2 102
Honduras 1995
Ho ur sHon ur  01Ho u as 12Indi  Indi  2005I i 1nd 20 2
Indonesia 1995
Indone ia 20 5In nesia 10i  2
Iran 2005Ir n 2010Ir  
Isra l 
s a l 200
Isra l 0
Jam ica 1995Ja a  00
J maic 5
Ja aica 1
Ja aica 2 12J rd  995J rdanJordan J dan 1 2
K z khst n 05K z khst n 010t  2
K ny  1995ny  00
Ko ea, South 05
Kyrgyzstan 2005
Kyrgyzstan 2010Kyrgyzstan 2012
Laos 1995L os 00L s 2005L os 2 10L os 2012
L ba on 2012
L sotho 95
L s tho 2tt  es t  1
Macedoni  
Mal wi 005M l wil i
Mal ysia (1966-) 2000
M l ysia ( 966-) 2005laysi  ( 966-) 201012
Maldives 1995
aldi es 0 5M l v s Maldiv s 2 12
Mali 1995Mali M li 20 5li 201i 20
Malta 
tltlt  
Mauritania 19952000
ur t us Maurit us 2012
exico 99exic  0i  0
M xic  1
Moldova 0102ongolia 20102
Morocco 199Morocco 2000
M r c o 0M r cco 10Mo occo 012
Moz bique 1995
oz mbique za que 2 5M za bique 010
Moz mbiqu  2012
N ibii ii 2
N p lNep  2 1ep l 201Nic ragu  0 5ica gua 10i
Nig r 1 95
NigerNig r N g
Om  2012
P kistan (1971-) 200510
Pa m  9 5
P n m
n  2 1
Papu New Guinea 1995 i  2000P pu  New Guinea 2005 i  2010
  i  2Par gu y r gu yr aaragu y 2 1
Peru 20 5Per  201
Phi pp es 99hi pp shi ppi s i n 1iliR da 5
Rw dan  005Rw ndS l 1995Sen l S eg l 5
Si rr Leo e 2 5i a 10i rr  12lovenia 2 5Sl  01Sl veni  
outh Africa 2 05
outh Afr ca t fric  2
Sri Lank
Sudan (-2 11) 1995
d (- ) 05
S d  (- 1 ) 2010
S iname 01
Swa iland 1995
Sw zil nd 0a il d 0w il 1Sw zil d 2
Syria 1995
Syri  5y
Syri  2012
Taji sta
T nz nia 2 5T z nia 
T iland 9 5
T a la  0i nd 2 5l nd 2
Togo 1995T  T  T g 2
Trinidad and Tobago 1995200
Tu is a 1995u isi  5i
Turk y 9
Tu keyT rk y 1T rkey 
Ugarug y 
Ve zuel  19 5
V ez l 5e ell
Yemen 20001
Zi b bwe 995
.2
.4
.6
.8
1
0 .05 .1 .15
Normalized residual squared
36 
 
Trinidad & Tobago 2005 and other overlapping cases. These visuals are supported by 
statistical tests for outliers, Cook’s distance and observations with high studentized 
residuals. The full list of the extreme and influential observations is enclosed in the 
appendix (table A3).  After removing them from the dataset, I gain the following results.  
Table 3.4. Fixed effects regression models without outliers and influential observations 
DV: Gender 
Inequality Index  
Model w/o inf  1  
b/se                                    
Model w/o inf 2   
b/se             
Model  w/o inf 3 
b/se             
Model w/o inf 4  
b/se             
IV: Remittances per 
capita, t-10 (log-
transformed) 
-0.020***                           
(0.00) 
-0.014*** 
(0.00) 
--0.019*** 
(0.00) 
-0.008** 
(0.00) 
CV1: GDP per capita, 
t-10 (log-transformed) 
 
-0.031*** 
(0.01) 
-0.025** 
(0.01) 
-0.004 
(0.01) 
CV2: ODA per capita, 
t-10 (log-transformed)  
  
0.013**                                                            
(0.00) 
0.005
(0.00) 
CV3: Index of 
globalization, t-10 
(log-transformed) 
   
-0.191*** 
(0.01) 
Constant (average 
value of the fixed 
effects) 
0.460***        
 (0.01) 
0.686***                                   
(0.07) 
0.695*** 
(0.06) 
1.259*** 
(0.06) 
R-sqr 0.098 0.126 0.278 0.624 
Number of 
observations 
456 453 306 294 
Number of countries 120 119 84 81 
Legend: *p<0.05,  ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
We see that the new results are very similar to the previous ones. It supports the idea 
that my fixed effects model with lagged independent variables is not distorted by the 
bias of influential observations. However the main difference of the latest model is the 
newly gained statistical significance and the larger regression estimate for ODA per 
capita in the third model (which supports our earlier suspicion that the relationship 
between GII and ODA is positive in this model) and the increase of the explanatory 
power of the predictors in the fourth model. As opposed to the previous models where 
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four predictors together accounted for slightly over 43 % of variation in the outcome 
variable, the new model without extreme observations accounts for 62.4 % of the 
variation in GII.     
Before I proceed to the next step I test my model for heteroscedascity as a final check of 
the model validity. I do it by examining normality of distribution of residuals and 
graphing a residuals-versus-fitted-values plot. The generated graphs are available in the 
appendix (graphs A2 and A3). Distribution of residuals seems to be close to perfectly 
normal. It appears to be deceiving though since sktest for normality reports skewness at 
0,74 level. This casts the suspicion that the data is not homoscedastic. The residuals-
versus-fitted-values plot displays that residuals are clustered more densely around the 
regression line in the right end of the plot. To control for potential heteroscedascity I 
resort to regression analysis with robust standard errors. The new regression model 
(attached in the appendix, table A2) generated slightly bigger standard errors, but the 
regression estimate values remain the same, still statistically significant and in line with 
my theory. This supports the idea that the results are robust and that the chosen 
method is a good fit to analyze the data.  
3.4. Relationship between different GII components and the predictors   
To test which of the components of GII is perceptive to remittances and other control 
variables I run the same fixed effects regressions for each GII component based on the 
assumptions of non-instantaneous relationship, fixed effects and outliers that held true 
for the previous model.  It might not be the case of course since component variables are 
different, and outliers for these models are likely to differ as well. However due to 
paper limitations and time constrains I don’t implement post-regression diagnostics for 
outliers and residuals in these models. So I assume that assumptions are valid for all of 
these models too: having missing values rather than highly influential observations 
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seems to be a lesser evil of the two.  The results are summarized in the table below. 
Table 3.5. FE Regression with separate GII components as dependent variables 
Independent 
Variables  
DV: Ratio of female to male 
secondary enrollment (log-transf.) 
DV: Proportion of seats held by 
women in parliaments (sqrt-transf.) 
DV: Ratio of female to male labour 
force participation (sqrt-transf.) 
Model 
SEF1 
b/se 
Model  
SEF2 
b/se 
Model  
SEF 3 
b/se 
Model  
SEF 4 
b/se 
Model 
FPRL1 
b/se 
Model  
FPRL2 
b/se 
Model  
FPRL 
3 
b/se 
Model  
FPRL 
4 
b/se 
Model 
LFP1 
b/se 
Model  
LFP2 
b/se 
Model  
LFP 3 
b/se 
Model  
LFP 4 
b/se 
IV: Remittances 
received per capita, 
lagged by 10 years 
(log-transformed) 
0.022 
*** 
(0.00) 
0.017 
** 
(0.01) 
0.026 
*** 
(0.01) 
-0.010 
 
(0.01) 
0.331 
*** 
(0.04) 
0.224 
*** 
(0.04) 
0.281 
*** 
(0.04) 
0.129 
** 
(0.05) 
0.012 
*** 
(0.00) 
0.007 
*** 
(0.00) 
0.009 
*** 
(0.00) 
0.006 
*** 
(0.00) 
CV1: GDP per capita, 
lagged by 10 years 
(log-transformed) 
 
0.010 
 
(0.01) 
0.018 
 
(0.02) 
-0.054 
*   
 (0.02)    
 
0.662 
*** 
(0.10) 
0.329 
* 
(0.12) 
-0.002 
   
 (0.15)    
 
0.030 
*** 
(0.00) 
0.020 
*** 
(0.00) 
0.013 
*   
 (0.01)    
CV2: ODA per capita, 
lagged by 10 years 
(log-transformed)   
  
-0.005 
 
(0.01) 
-0.010 
 
(0.01)      
  
-0.243 
** 
(0.06) 
-0.080 
(0.07)      
  
-0.001 
** 
(0.00) 
0.001 
(0.00)      
CV3: Index of 
globalization, lagged 
by 10 years (log-
transformed) 
    
0.383 
*** 
(0.05)    
    
2.930 
*** 
(0.30)    
   
0.061 
*** 
(0.01)    
Constant  
4.470 
*** 
(0.01) 
4.409 
*** 
(0.08) 
4.329 
*** 
(0.11) 
3.544 
*** 
(0.23) 
2.771 
*** 
(0.11) 
-1.983 
** 
(0.75) 
1.107 
 
(0.88) 
-7.516 
*** 
(1.35) 
0.775 
*** 
(0.00) 
0.562 
*** 
(0.02) 
0.631 
*** 
(0.03) 
-0.458 
*** 
(0.05) 
R-sqr 0.045 0.041 0.070 0.211    0.144 0.208 0.195 0.370    0.125 0.224 0.170 0.213    
N 690  676 526 323 719 711 557 403 866 845 667 467 
 
 
  
Independent Variables 
DV: Maternal Mortality Ratio  
(log-transformed) 
DV: Adolescent fertility rate  
(sqrt-transformed) 
Model 
MMR 1 
b/se 
Model  
MMR2 
b/se 
Model  
MMR 3 
b/se 
Model  
MMR 4 
b/se 
Model 
AFR 1 
b/se 
Model  
AFR 2 
b/se 
Model  
AFR 3 
b/se 
Model  
AFR 4 
b/se 
IV: Remittances received per 
capita, lagged by 10 years 
(log-transformed) 
-0.102 
*** 
(0.01) 
-0.065 
*** 
(0.01) 
-0.088 
*** 
(0.02) 
-0.019 
 
(0.02) 
-0.364 
*** 
(0.02) 
-0.191 
*** 
(0.03) 
-0.227 
*** 
(0.03) 
-0.053 
(0.03) 
CV1: GDP per capita, lagged 
by 10 years (log-transformed) 
 
-0.191 
*** 
(0.04) 
-0.170 
** 
(0.04) 
0.024  
  
 (0.04)    
 
-0.691 
*** 
(0.06) 
-0.705 
*** 
(0.08) 
-0.343 
***   
 (0.10)    
CV2: ODA per capita, lagged 
by 10 years (log-transformed) 
  
0.049 
* 
(0.02) 
0.033 
 
(0.02)     
  
0.194 
*** 
(0.04) 
0.185 
** * 
(0.05)      
CV3: Index of globalization, 
lagged by 10 years (log-
transformed) 
 
 
 
  
 
-1.181 
*** 
(0.10)    
 
 
 
  
 
-2.607 
*** 
(0.22)    
Constant 
4.758 
*** 
(0.04) 
6.082 
*** 
(0.26) 
6.277 
*** 
(0.29) 
9.184 
*** 
(0.44) 
8.231 
*** 
(0.07) 
12.964 
*** 
(0.45) 
13.091 
*** 
(0.55) 
19.911 
*** 
(0.95) 
R-sqr 0.099 0.140 0.182  0.404   0.244 0.336 0.335  0.456    
N 698  680 547 385 960  933 739 482 
Legend: *p<0.05,  ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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For each of the five new dependent variables we have 4 new models, or  20 new models 
in total. For my assumption that ‘the effect of remittances on GII’s separate components 
is beneficial’ to be valid, the relationship between remittances and first three  models 
(female to male secondary enrollment ratio, female to male labour force participation 
ratio and proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments) should be 
positive. The higher the value of standardized coefficients for models with these 
dependent variables is, the more positive the effect of remittances on these variables is. 
For the other two components (maternal mortality ratio and adolescent fertility rate) the 
relationship with remittances should be negative.  The higher level of remittances 
results in the lower maternal mortality and adolescent fertility rates. We see that apart 
from the Model SEF 4 (where the secondary enrollment is as an outcome variable), the 
signs of β-coefficients of remittances in all of the rest models are in line with this 
assumption. We can’t accept this assumption by rejecting the null hypothesis for all of 
them since some of them do not sustain statistical significance. Remittances in the 
models that include from 1 to 3 predictors are statistically significant. This attests that 
the data in these models support this assumption.  Some of the fourth models that 
involve all vectors of the independent variable do not sustain statistical significance. 
The models with proportion of females in national parliaments and female-to-male- 
labor-force participation ratio are significant which allows us to state that remittances 
exert positive effect on these indicators even in the presence of highly influential index 
of globalization. These results support the theoretical discussion presented in the 
beginning of the paper about the potentially positive effect of remittances on women’s 
rising level of employment and political activity. 
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3.5. Limitations of the research  
It is often argued in academic circles that quantitative methods cannot be applied to 
gender-related research “since women’s experiences cannot be reduced to numbers” 
(Scott, 2010:235). It is probably true to some extent. This is the reason why there is still 
no good comprehensive index capturing gender inequality because of the lack of data 
on some aspects of gender inequality that women (as opposed to men) might be 
experiencing on a daily basis at home or in the street but cannot compute this 
experience into digits.   
That is also one of the limitations of this research. Gender Inequality index, while 
measuring maternal mortality rates and adolescent fertility rates (indices related more 
to human development rather than status inequality as argued by many) does not 
capture the nature of gender relations/gender hierarchy at home. I was discussing in the 
theoretical part of the paper that remittances through the women’s increasing 
breadwinning role or through women’s increasing access to household resources 
contribute amongst others to changing gender roles and changing traditional labour 
division within the family.  It is basically impossible to assess the within-the-family-
relationship role of remittances based on the given GII data. We can’t examine the 
changes of women’s status at home or how much of housework or childcare is shared 
between the spouses. That is probably something that can be complemented with 
qualitative methods, but then it would be limited to a small number of units of 
observations.  
Another limitation of the research is caused by the lack of data on gender-segregated 
remittances levels. In this research I have used total remittances sent by migrants of 
both sexes which is fine since it does not contradict my theory: we discussed in the 
theoretical part the potentially positive effects of remittances on reducing gender 
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inequality regardless of whether women act as remitters from abroad or recipients of 
remittances from their spouses abroad. It would have been interesting nevertheless to 
see whether the effect of remittances sent by migrant women differ from the effect of 
those sent by migrant men.  
One more limitation is related to the analysis where I tested the relationship between 
remittances and different components of GII. I used the same assumptions that held 
ground for the model involving fixed effects and removed outliers.  If some 
assumptions appeared to be valid for GII, we cannot assume that the same assumptions 
hold for all components of the GII as well.  We can’t assume that the Hausman test 
would hold the fixed effects assumption for all components, or that outliers identified 
for GII regression would be the same for all components as well.  If time and resources 
allow, it is preferable to implement the same step-by-step diagnostics for the each 
component to get a more accurate picture.   
While quantitative research does not capture the dimensions like childcare or unpaid 
labour work or availability of parental leaves for both spouses, it allows for analysis of 
processes across a large number of units over relatively lengthy period of time with 
controlling for other important dimensions. The method employed in this paper 
allowed to answer the research question and generated the results supporting my 
hypotheses. Perhaps it also contributed to address the existing research gap in the 
literature because until now there has not been a research done on this particular topic 
based on time-series-cross-sectional data.  
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Conclusion  
 
There is a lot of literature on gender inequality, its causes and feminist policies. 
However there is not so much literature on the link between gender inequality and 
remittances. By exploring the link between the two in quantitative terms the research 
aim of the thesis was to answer how remittances, as transnational carriers of social 
capital, contribute to empowerment of women in migrants countries of origin and  
contribute to filling the existing gap on the topic.  
By using TSCS data for 141 countries and time period 1995-2012 the research operated 
on Gender Inequality Index as dependent variable and remittances per capita as an 
independent variable with controls for GDP, official development aid and the index of 
globalization.  
Empirical findings based on the fixed effects models, particularly the one with lagged 
independent variables, reveal that remittances tend to contribute to reducing gender 
inequality in migrants’ countries of origin, and that the effect is greater in the long run. 
Controlling for additional predictors slightly took away from the remittances effects 
value which is predictable, but it did not change the (negative) character of the 
relationship between remittances and Gender Inequality Index. Implementation of 
some post-regression diagnostics also proved validity of the model and supported the 
idea that the chosen method is a good fit to analyze the data.  
Regression on GII’ separate components reveal similar picture. Not all models were 
significant in this case. Remittances sustained significance in models involving 
proportion of females in national parliaments and female-to-male-labor-force 
participation ratio which allows us to state that remittances exert positive effect on these 
indicators. These results support the theoretical discussion presented in the beginning 
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of the paper about the potentially positive effect of remittances on women’s rising level 
of employment and political activity. 
The academic value of the current research might be the fact that it seems to be the first 
research employing TSCS data for a broad set of countries over relatively lengthy 
period of time. It complements well the existing academic works that mostly employ 
quantitative methods.  
There were limitations of this research mostly related to the unavailability of data as 
discussion in the last section. It still allowed us to answer the research question, posed 
in the beginning of the paper. The things that we could not answer due to these 
limitations might call for another research in the future.  
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Appendix 
Table A1. Description of variables 
Variable  
Number of 
Observations  
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Year 1805 1999.501 9.401468 1985 2012 
Country 1755 130.9299 83.10702 1 512 
Gender Inequality Index  608 0.4169901 0.1982354 0.05 0.879 
Remittances per capita  1168 151.4708 821.3572 0 19369.45 
GDP per capita 1490 9324.654 15476.79 64.81015 145229.8 
ODA per capita  1194 107.55 356.7115 -34.81404 8248.044 
Index of Globalization  982 49.30829 18.09876 16.36343 92.69766 
  
Remittances per capita (log-
transformed) 1166 3.388884 2.086822 -6.137032 9.871452 
GDP per capita (log-transformed) 1490 7.995337 1.604576 4.171462 11.88607 
ODA per capita (log-transformed) 1176 3.306179 1.810213 -6.115122 9.017732 
Index of globalization, log- 
(transformed) 
982 3.827626 0.3839741 2.795049 4.529343 
  
 
Remittances per capita, lagged by 
10 years 974 65.4711 149.339 0.0065572 1815.172 
GDP per capita, lagged by 10 years 1385 6088.766 10478.26 64.81015 101963.2 
ODA per capita, lagged by 10 years 1188 97.27712 415.578 -34.81404 8248.044 
Index of globalization, lagged by 10 
years 931 46.15826 17.82101 14.95076 92.69766 
  
Remittances per capita, lagged by 
10 years (log-transformed) 974 2.737091 2.028396 -5.027191 7.503935 
GDP per capita, lagged by 10 years 
(log-transformed) 1385 7.584985 1.545771 4.171462 11.53237 
ODA per capita, lagged by 10 years 
(log-transformed) 1173 2.987549 1.896123 -9.389469 9.017732 
Index of globalization, lagged by 10 
years (log-transformed) 931 3.75631 0.3955225 2.704762 4.529343 
  
Adolescent fertility rate  1546 62.88049 46.65122 0.617 228.96 
Maternal Mortality Rate 1038 237.9441 306.0891 2 1900 
Proportion of seats held by women 
in national parliaments 978 15.16943 10.13175 0 56.3 
Ratio of female to male secondary 
enrollment 982 93.83301 19.46155 18.035 208.14 
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Ratio of female to male labour force 
participation  1267 0.6710315 0.1990397 0.1203474 1.079602 
  
Adolescent fertility rate  
(sqrt-transformed) 
1546 7.339802 3.00227 0.7854935 15.13142 
Maternal mortality ratio (log-
transformed) 1038 4.468666 1.593165 0.6931472 7.549609 
Proportion of seats held by women 
in parliaments (sqrt-transformed) 978 3.617312 1.444514 0 7.503333 
Ratio of female to male secondary 
enrollment (log-transformed) 982 4.513783 0.2553071 2.892314 5.338211 
Ratio of female to male labour force 
participation (sqrt-transformed) 1267 0.8079044 0.1354123 0.3469112 1.039039 
 
 
Graph A1. Relationship between remittances per capita and Gender Inequality Index6 
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 Two-way scatterplot depicting relationship between remittances per capita (log-transformed) and Gender 
Inequality Index 1995-2012.  
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Table A2. Outliers and Influential Observations  
Country  Outlier  
absr1>3 
Influential 
observations 
dfit1>2*sqrt(4/32
3) 
Cook’s distance  
d1>4/323 
 
Azerbaijan 2012      .3441335 
Bolivia 1995    4.765147  .0560317 
Burkina Faso 
2012 
  .8467723 
Central African 
Republic 1995   
  
.6360201 
China 1995    -4.072485  .0548657 
China 2000     6.184412  .093325 
Cyprus 1995   .4763094 
Georgia 2012     .3396498 
Guatemala 1995     .7629743 .0216541 
Honduras 1995      .0362105 
Indonesia 1995    -3.188355  .0383126 
Korea, South 
2005  
  1.811167 
Kyrgyzstan 2005     4.388646  .099597 
Kyrgyzstan 2010      .0235539 
Kyrgyzstan 2012      .0223093 
Laos 1995  5.555864  .0873773 
Laos 2010  .3704624 .0119077 
Laos 2012  .3389125 .0102367 
Lebanon 2012       .611793 
Macedonia 2012    .9335664 
Maldives 1995    3.804951 .3957748 .0588365 
Morocco 1995      .0175461 
Oman 2012      .1714714 
Suriname 2012      .1714714 
Tajikistan 2012      .0190524 
Togo 1995   .0265524 
Turkey 2012     .0172823 
Uganda 2012      .0762095 
Zimbabwe 1995   .304838 
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Graph A2. Distribution of residuals 
 
 
 
Graph A3. Residual-versus-fitted-values plot 
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Table A3. Fixed effects regression models with robust standard errors 
DV: Gender 
Inequality Index  
Model w/ rse  1  
b/rse                                    
Model w/ rse  2   
b/rse             
Model w/ rse  3 
b/rse             
Model w/ rse  4  
b/rse             
IV: Remittances 
per capita, t-10 
(log-transformed) 
-0.020***                           
(0.00) 
-0.014*** 
(0.00) 
--0.019*** 
(0.00) 
-0.008** 
(0.00) 
CV1: GDP per 
capita, t-10 (log-
transformed) 
 
-0.031*** 
(0.01) 
-0.025** 
(0.01) 
-0.004 
(0.01) 
CV2: ODA per 
capita, t-10 (log-
transformed)  
  
0.013**                                                            
(0.01) 
0.005
(0.00) 
CV3: Index of 
globalization, t-10 
(log-transformed) 
   
-0.191*** 
(0.02) 
Constant (average 
value of the fixed 
effects) 
0.460***        
 (0.01) 
0.686***                                   
(0.06) 
0.695*** 
(0.08) 
1.259*** 
(0.08) 
R-sqr 0.098 0.126 0.278 0.624 
Number of 
observations 
456 453 306 294 
Number of 
countries  
120 119 84 81 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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Table A4. Gender Inequality Index 2013 (UNDP) 7 
 
HDI 
rank 
Country 
Gender 
Inequality 
Index   
Maternal 
mortality 
ratio 
Adolescent 
birth rate 
Share of 
seats in 
parliament 
Population 
with at least 
some secondary 
education 
(% aged 25 and 
above) 
Labour Force 
Participation 
rate  
(% aged 15 and 
above) 
Value Rank   
(deaths 
per 
100,000 
live 
births) 
(births per 
1,000 
women 
aged 15-19) 
 (% held by 
women) Female Male Female Male 
2013 2013   2010 2010/2015 2013 
2005-
2012 
2005-
2012 2012 2012 
VERY HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
1 Norway 0.068 9 
 
7 7.8 39.6 97.4 96.7 61.5 69.5 
2 Australia 0.113 19 
 
7 12.1 29.2 94.3 94.6 58.8 71.9 
3 Switzerland 0.030 2 
 
8 1.9 27.2 95.0 96.6 61.2 75.3 
4 Netherlands 0.057 7 
 
6 6.2 37.8 87.7 90.5 79.9 87.3 
5 United States 0.262 47 
 
21 31.0 18.2 95.1 94.8 56.8 69.3 
6 Germany 0.046 3 
 
7 3.8 32.4 96.3 97.0 53.5 66.4 
7 New Zealand 0.185 34 
 
15 25.3 32.2 95.0 95.3 62.1 73.9 
8 Canada 0.136 23 
 
12 14.5 28.0 100.0 100.0 61.6 71.2 
9 Singapore 0.090 15 
 
3 6.0 24.2 74.1 81.0 59.0 77.5 
10 Denmark 0.056 5 
 
12 5.1 39.1 95.5 96.6 59.1 67.5 
11 Ireland 0.115 20 
 
6 8.2 19.5 80.5 78.6 52.7 67.9 
12 Sweden 0.054 4 
 
4 6.5 44.7 86.5 87.3 60.2 68.1 
13 Iceland 0.088 14 
 
5 11.5 39.7 91.0 91.6 70.6 77.3 
14 United Kingdom 0.193 35 
 
12 25.8 22.6 99.8 99.9 55.7 68.8 
15 
Hong Kong, 
China (SAR) 
.. .. 
 
.. 3.3 .. 72.2 79.2 51.6 68.0 
15 
Korea (Republic 
of) 
0.101 17 
 
16 2.2 15.7 77.0 89.1 49.9 72.0 
17 Japan 0.138 25 
 
5 5.4 10.8 87.0 85.8 48.1 70.4 
18 Liechtenstein .. .. 
 
.. .. 20.0 .. .. .. .. 
19 Israel 0.101 17 
 
7 7.8 22.5 84.4 87.3 58.1 69.5 
20 France 0.080 12 
 
8 5.7 25.1 78.0 83.2 50.9 61.8 
21 Austria 0.056 5 
 
4 4.1 28.7 100.0 100.0 54.6 67.7 
21 Belgium 0.068 9 
 
8 6.7 38.9 77.5 82.9 46.9 59.4 
21 Luxembourg 0.154 29 
 
20 8.3 21.7 100.0 100.0 50.7 64.9 
                                                          
7 Source: Human Development Report (2014), UNDP 
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24 Finland 0.075 11 
 
5 9.2 42.5 100.0 100.0 56.0 64.3 
25 Slovenia 0.021 1 
 
12 0.6 24.6 95.8 98.0 52.3 63.5 
26 Italy 0.067 8 
 
4 4.0 30.6 71.2 80.5 39.4 59.4 
27 Spain 0.100 16 
 
6 10.6 35.2 66.8 73.1 52.6 66.5 
28 Czech Republic 0.087 13 
 
5 4.9 20.6 99.9 99.7 50.1 67.8 
29 Greece 0.146 27 
 
3 11.9 21.0 59.5 67.0 44.2 62.6 
30 
Brunei 
Darussalam 
.. .. 
 
24 23.0 .. 66.6 61.2 52.9 75.6 
31 Qatar 0.524 113 
 
7 9.5 0.1 66.7 59.0 50.8 95.6 
32 Cyprus 0.136 23 
 
10 5.5 10.7 72.2 79.6 55.8 70.8 
33 Estonia 0.154 29 
 
2 16.8 20.8 100.0 100.0 56.0 68.7 
34 Saudi Arabia 0.321 56 
 
24 10.2 19.9 60.5 70.3 18.2 75.5 
35 Lithuania 0.116 21 
 
8 10.6 24.1 89.1 94.3 55.8 66.3 
35 Poland 0.139 26 
 
5 12.2 21.8 79.4 85.5 48.9 64.8 
37 Andorra .. .. 
 
.. .. 50.0 49.5 49.3 .. .. 
37 Slovakia 0.164 32 
 
6 15.9 18.7 99.1 99.5 51.0 68.7 
39 Malta 0.220 41 
 
8 18.2 14.3 68.6 78.2 38.0 66.5 
40 
United Arab 
Emirates 
0.244 43 
 
12 27.6 17.5 73.1 61.3 46.6 91.0 
41 Chile 0.355 68 
 
25 55.3 13.9 73.3 76.4 49.0 74.6 
41 Portugal 0.116 21 
 
8 12.6 28.7 47.7 48.2 55.4 67.2 
43 Hungary 0.247 45 
 
21 12.1 8.8 97.9 98.7 44.7 59.9 
44 Bahrain 0.253 46 
 
20 13.8 18.8 74.4 80.4 39.4 87.2 
44 Cuba 0.350 66 
 
73 43.1 48.9 73.9 80.4 43.3 70.1 
46 Kuwait 0.288 50 
 
14 14.5 6.2 55.6 56.3 43.4 82.8 
47 Croatia 0.172 33 
 
17 12.7 23.8 85.0 93.6 44.8 58.5 
48 Latvia 0.222 42 
 
34 13.5 23.0 98.9 99.0 54.5 67.1 
49 Argentina 0.381 74 
 
77 54.4 37.7 57.0 54.9 47.3 75.0 
HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
50 Uruguay 0.364 70 
 
29 58.3 12.3 54.4 50.3 55.5 76.8 
51 Bahamas 0.316 53 
 
47 28.5 16.7 91.2 87.6 69.3 79.3 
51 Montenegro .. .. 
 
8 15.2 17.3 84.2 94.7 .. .. 
53 Belarus 0.152 28 
 
4 20.6 29.5 87.0 92.2 49.9 62.7 
54 Romania 0.320 54 
 
27 31.0 11.6 86.1 92.0 48.5 64.7 
55 Libya 0.215 40 
 
58 2.5 16.5 55.6 44.0 30.0 76.4 
56 Oman 0.348 64 
 
32 10.6 9.6 47.2 57.1 28.6 81.8 
57 
Russian 
Federation 
0.314 52 
 
34 25.7 12.1 89.6 92.5 57.0 71.4 
58 Bulgaria 0.207 38 
 
11 35.9 24.6 93.0 95.7 47.8 58.8 
59 Barbados 0.350 66 
 
51 48.4 21.6 89.5 87.6 65.9 76.7 
60 Palau .. .. 
 
.. .. 10.3 .. .. .. .. 
55 
 
61 
Antigua and 
Barbuda 
.. .. 
 
.. 49.3 19.4 .. .. .. .. 
62 Malaysia 0.210 39 
 
29 5.7 13.9 66.0 72.8 44.3 75.3 
63 Mauritius 0.375 72 
 
60 30.9 18.8 49.4 58.0 43.5 74.3 
64 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
0.321 56 
 
46 34.8 26.0 59.4 59.2 52.9 75.5 
65 Lebanon 0.413 80 
 
25 12.0 3.1 38.8 38.9 22.8 70.5 
65 Panama 0.506 107 
 
92 78.5 8.5 63.5 60.7 49.0 81.9 
67 
Venezuela 
(Bolivarian 
Republic of) 
0.464 96 
 
92 83.2 17.0 56.5 50.8 50.9 79.2 
68 Costa Rica 0.344 63 
 
40 60.8 38.6 54.5 52.8 46.4 79.0 
69 Turkey 0.360 69 
 
20 30.9 14.2 39.0 60.0 29.4 70.8 
70 Kazakhstan 0.323 59 
 
51 29.9 18.2 99.3 99.4 67.5 77.5 
71 Mexico 0.376 73 
 
50 63.4 36.0 55.7 60.6 45.0 80.0 
71 Seychelles .. .. 
 
.. 56.3 43.8 66.9 66.6 .. .. 
73 
Saint Kitts and 
Nevis 
.. .. 
 
.. .. 6.7 .. .. .. .. 
73 Sri Lanka 0.383 75 
 
35 16.9 5.8 72.7 75.5 35.0 76.4 
75 
Iran (Islamic 
Republic of) 
0.510 109 
 
21 31.6 3.1 62.2 67.6 16.4 73.1 
76 Azerbaijan 0.340 62 
 
43 40.0 16.0 93.7 97.4 62.5 68.9 
77 Jordan 0.488 101 
 
63 26.5 12.0 69.5 78.5 15.3 66.2 
77 Serbia .. .. 
 
12 16.9 33.2 58.4 73.6 .. .. 
79 Brazil 0.441 85 
 
56 70.8 9.6 51.9 49.0 59.5 80.9 
79 Georgia .. .. 
 
67 46.8 12.0 .. .. 56.2 74.7 
79 Grenada .. .. 
 
24 35.4 25.0 .. .. .. .. 
82 Peru 0.387 77 
 
67 50.7 21.5 56.3 66.1 68.0 84.4 
83 Ukraine 0.326 61 
 
32 25.7 9.4 91.5 96.1 53.0 66.6 
84 Belize 0.435 84 
 
53 71.4 13.3 35.2 32.8 49.1 82.3 
84 
The former 
Yugoslav 
Republic of 
Macedonia 
0.162 31 
 
10 18.3 34.1 40.2 55.6 42.9 67.3 
86 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
0.201 36 
 
8 15.1 19.3 44.8 70.0 34.1 57.2 
87 Armenia 0.325 60 
 
30 27.1 10.7 94.1 94.8 51.6 73.4 
88 Fiji .. .. 
 
26 42.8 .. 57.5 58.1 37.5 72.0 
89 Thailand 0.364 70 
 
48 41.0 15.7 35.7 40.8 64.4 80.8 
90 Tunisia 0.265 48 
 
56 4.6 26.7 32.8 46.1 25.1 70.6 
91 China 0.202 37 
 
37 8.6 23.4 58.7 71.9 63.8 78.1 
91 
Saint Vincent 
and the 
Grenadines 
.. .. 
 
48 54.5 13.0 .. .. 55.7 78.2 
56 
 
93 Algeria 0.425 81 
 
97 10.0 25.8 20.9 27.3 15.0 71.9 
93 Dominica .. .. 
 
.. .. 12.5 29.7 23.2 .. .. 
95 Albania 0.245 44 
 
27 15.3 17.9 81.8 87.9 45.0 65.4 
96 Jamaica 0.457 88 
 
110 70.1 15.5 74.0 71.1 56.1 71.0 
97 Saint Lucia .. .. 
 
35 56.3 17.2 .. .. 62.6 76.0 
98 Colombia 0.460 92 
 
92 68.5 13.6 56.9 55.6 55.7 79.7 
98 Ecuador 0.429 82 
 
110 77.0 38.7 40.1 39.4 54.4 82.6 
100 Suriname 0.463 95 
 
130 35.2 11.8 44.6 47.1 40.4 68.8 
100 Tonga 0.458 90 
 
110 18.1 3.6 87.5 88.3 53.5 74.8 
102 
Dominican 
Republic 
0.505 105 
 
150 99.6 19.1 55.6 53.1 51.2 78.7 
MEDIUM HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
103 Maldives 0.283 49 
 
60 4.2 6.5 13.3 16.6 55.9 77.1 
103 Mongolia 0.320 54 
 
63 18.7 14.9 85.3 84.1 56.1 68.8 
103 Turkmenistan .. .. 
 
67 18.0 16.8 .. .. 46.7 76.5 
106 Samoa 0.517 111 
 
100 28.3 4.1 64.3 60.0 23.4 58.4 
107 
Palestine, State 
of 
.. .. 
 
64 45.8 .. 31.5 32.2 15.2 66.3 
108 Indonesia 0.500 103 
 
220 48.3 18.6 39.9 49.2 51.3 84.4 
109 Botswana 0.486 100 
 
160 44.2 7.9 73.6 77.3 71.8 81.5 
110 Egypt 0.580 130 
 
66 43.0 2.8 43.4 59.3 23.6 74.6 
111 Paraguay 0.457 88 
 
99 67.0 18.4 36.8 40.8 55.4 84.8 
112 Gabon 0.508 108 
 
230 103.0 16.7 53.8 34.7 56.0 65.1 
113 
Bolivia 
(Plurinational 
State of) 
0.472 97 
 
190 71.9 30.1 47.6 59.1 64.1 80.9 
114 
Moldova 
(Republic of) 
0.302 51 
 
41 29.3 19.8 93.6 96.6 37.0 43.3 
115 El Salvador 0.441 85 
 
81 76.0 26.2 36.8 43.6 47.6 79.0 
116 Uzbekistan .. .. 
 
28 38.8 19.2 .. .. 47.9 75.2 
117 Philippines 0.406 78 
 
99 46.8 26.9 65.9 63.8 51.0 79.7 
118 South Africa 0.461 94 
 
300 50.9 41.1 72.7 75.9 44.2 60.0 
118 
Syria, Arab 
Republic 
0.556 125 
 
70 41.6 12.0 29.0 38.9 13.4 72.7 
120 Iraq 0.542 120 
 
63 68.7 25.2 22.0 42.7 14.7 69.7 
121 Guyana 0.524 113 
 
280 88.5 31.3 61.5 48.8 42.3 80.9 
121 Viet Nam 0.322 58 
 
59 29.0 24.4 59.4 71.2 72.8 81.9 
123 Cape Verde .. .. 
 
79 70.6 20.8 .. .. 51.1 83.5 
124 
Micronesia 
(Federated States 
of) 
.. .. 
 
100 18.6 0.1 .. .. .. .. 
125 Guatemala 0.523 112 
 
120 97.2 13.3 21.9 23.2 49.1 88.2 
125 Kyrgyzstan 0.348 64 
 
71 29.3 23.3 94.5 96.8 55.7 79.0 
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127 Namibia 0.450 87 
 
200 54.9 25.0 33.0 34.0 75.2 82.2 
128 Timor-Leste .. .. 
 
300 52.2 38.5 .. .. 24.7 51.1 
129 Honduras 0.482 99 
 
100 84.0 19.5 28.0 25.8 42.5 82.9 
129 Morocco 0.460 92 
 
100 35.8 11.0 20.1 36.3 43.0 57.4 
131 Vanuatu .. .. 
 
110 44.8 0.1 .. .. 61.5 80.3 
132 Nicaragua 0.458 90 
 
95 100.8 40.2 30.8 44.7 47.0 80.1 
133 Kiribati .. .. 
 
.. 16.6 8.7 .. .. .. .. 
133 Tajikistan 0.383 75 
 
65 42.8 17.5 89.9 95.0 58.7 76.9 
135 India 0.563 127 
 
200 32.8 10.9 26.6 50.4 28.8 80.9 
136 Bhutan 0.495 102 
 
180 40.9 6.9 34.0 34.5 66.4 76.9 
136 Cambodia 0.505 105 
 
250 44.3 18.1 9.9 22.2 78.9 86.5 
138 Ghana 0.549 123 
 
350 58.4 10.9 45.2 64.7 67.2 71.2 
139 
Lao People's 
Democratic 
Republic 
0.534 118 
 
470 65.0 25.0 22.9 36.8 76.3 78.9 
140 Congo 0.617 135 
 
560 126.7 9.6 43.8 48.7 68.4 72.9 
141 Zambia 0.617 135 
 
440 125.4 11.5 25.7 44.2 73.2 85.7 
142 Bangladesh 0.529 115 
 
240 80.6 19.7 30.8 39.3 57.3 84.1 
142 
Sao Tome and 
Principe 
.. .. 
 
70 65.1 18.2 .. .. 44.9 77.5 
144 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
.. .. 
 
240 112.6 18.8 .. .. 80.6 92.3 
LOW HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 
145 Nepal 0.479 98 
 
170 73.7 33.2 17.9 39.9 54.3 63.2 
146 Pakistan 0.563 127 
 
260 27.3 19.7 19.3 46.1 24.4 82.9 
147 Kenya 0.548 122 
 
360 93.6 19.9 25.3 31.4 62.0 72.2 
148 Swaziland 0.529 115 
 
320 72.0 21.9 49.9 46.1 43.8 71.3 
149 Angola .. .. 
 
450 170.2 34.1 .. .. 63.1 76.9 
150 Myanmar 0.430 83 
 
200 12.1 4.6 18.0 17.6 85.7 82.9 
151 Rwanda 0.410 79 
 
340 33.6 51.9 7.4 8.0 86.5 85.5 
152 Cameroon 0.622 138 
 
690 115.8 16.1 21.1 34.9 63.6 76.7 
152 Nigeria .. .. 
 
630 119.6 6.6 .. .. 48.1 63.5 
154 Yemen 0.733 152 
 
200 47.0 0.7 7.6 24.4 25.2 71.8 
155 Madagascar .. .. 
 
240 122.8 15.8 .. .. 86.8 90.6 
156 Zimbabwe 0.516 110 
 
570 60.3 35.1 48.8 62.0 83.2 89.7 
157 
Papua New 
Guinea 
0.617 135 
 
230 62.1 2.7 6.8 14.1 70.5 74.0 
157 Solomon Islands .. .. 
 
93 64.9 2.0 .. .. 53.4 79.1 
159 Comoros .. .. 
 
280 51.1 3.0 .. .. 35.0 80.2 
159 
Tanzania 
(United Republic 
of) 
0.553 124 
 
460 122.7 36.0 5.6 9.2 88.1 90.2 
161 Mauritania 0.644 142 
 
510 73.3 19.2 8.0 20.8 28.6 79.0 
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162 Lesotho 0.557 126 
 
620 89.4 26.8 21.9 19.8 58.8 73.3 
163 Senegal 0.537 119 
 
370 94.4 42.7 7.2 15.4 65.9 88.0 
164 Uganda 0.529 115 
 
310 126.6 35.0 22.9 33.5 75.9 79.3 
165 Benin 0.614 134 
 
350 90.2 8.4 11.2 25.6 67.5 78.3 
166 Sudan 0.628 140 
 
730 84.0 24.1 12.8 18.2 31.2 76.0 
166 Togo 0.579 129 
 
300 91.5 15.4 15.3 45.1 80.7 81.2 
168 Haiti 0.599 132 
 
350 42.0 3.5 22.5 36.3 60.6 70.8 
169 Afghanistan 0.705 149 
 
460 86.8 27.6 5.8 34.0 15.7 79.7 
170 Djibouti .. .. 
 
200 18.6 12.7 .. .. 36.1 67.3 
171 Côte d'Ivoire 0.645 143 
 
400 130.3 10.4 13.7 29.9 52.2 81.5 
172 Gambia 0.624 139 
 
360 115.8 7.5 16.9 31.4 72.2 83.0 
173 Ethiopia 0.547 121 
 
350 78.4 25.5 7.8 18.2 78.2 89.4 
174 Malawi 0.591 131 
 
460 144.8 22.3 10.4 20.4 84.7 81.3 
175 Liberia 0.655 145 
 
770 117.4 11.7 15.7 39.2 58.2 64.7 
176 Mali 0.673 148 
 
540 175.6 10.2 7.7 15.1 50.6 81.4 
177 Guinea-Bissau .. .. 
 
790 99.3 14.0 .. .. 68.1 78.5 
178 Mozambique 0.657 146 
 
490 137.8 39.2 1.5 6.0 26.3 75.8 
179 Guinea .. .. 
 
610 131.0 .. .. .. 65.5 78.3 
180 Burundi 0.501 104 
 
800 30.3 34.9 5.2 9.3 83.2 81.8 
181 Burkina Faso 0.607 133 
 
300 115.4 15.7 0.9 3.2 77.1 90.1 
182 Eritrea .. .. 
 
240 65.3 22.0 .. .. 79.9 89.8 
183 Sierra Leone 0.643 141 
 
890 100.7 12.4 9.5 20.4 65.7 68.9 
184 Chad 0.707 150 
 
1,100 152.0 14.9 1.7 9.9 64.0 79.2 
185 
Central African 
Republic 
0.654 144 
 
890 98.3 12.5 10.3 26.2 72.5 85.1 
186 
Congo 
(Democratic 
Republic of the) 
0.669 147 
 
540 135.3 8.3 10.7 36.2 70.7 73.2 
187 Niger 0.709 151 
 
590 204.8 13.3 2.5 7.6 39.9 89.8 
OTHER COUNTRIES OR TERRITORIES 
  
Korea 
(Democratic 
People's Rep. of) 
.. .. 
 
81 0.6 15.6 .. .. 72.3 84.2 
  Marshall Islands .. .. 
 
.. .. 3.0 .. .. .. .. 
  Monaco .. .. 
 
.. .. 20.8 .. .. .. .. 
  Nauru .. .. 
 
.. .. 5.3 .. .. .. .. 
  San Marino .. .. 
 
.. .. 18.3 .. .. .. .. 
  Somalia .. .. 
 
1,000 110.4 13.8 .. .. 37.2 75.6 
  South Sudan .. .. 
 
.. 75.3 24.3 .. .. .. .. 
  Tuvalu .. .. 
 
.. .. 6.7 .. .. .. .. 
    
          
  HUMAN DEVELOPMENT GROUPS 
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Very high 
human 
development 
0.197 — 
 
16 19.2 26.7 86.1 87.7 52.3 69.0 
  
High human 
development 
0.315 — 
 
42 28.8 18.8 60.2 69.1 57.1 77.1 
  
Medium human 
development 
0.513 — 
 
186 43.4 17.5 34.2 51.4 38.7 80.0 
  
Low human 
development 
0.587 — 
 
427 92.3 20.0 14.3 28.6 55.7 78.4 
    
          
  REGIONS 
  Arab States 0.546 — 
 
164 45.4 13.8 32.9 46.4 24.7 73.2 
  
East Asia and 
the Pacific 
0.331 — 
 
72 21.2 18.7 54.6 66.4 62.8 79.3 
  
Europe and 
Central Asia 
0.317 — 
 
31 30.8 18.2 70.4 80.6 45.5 70.2 
  
Latin America 
and the 
Caribbean 
0.416 — 
 
74 68.3 25.3 53.3 53.9 53.7 79.8 
  South Asia 0.539 — 
 
202 38.7 17.8 28.4 49.9 30.7 80.7 
  
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
0.578 — 
 
474 109.7 21.7 21.9 31.9 63.6 76.3 
    
          
  
Least developed 
countries 
0.571 — 
 
389 97.0 20.3 15.8 26.4 64.0 81.6 
  
Small island 
developing 
states 
0.478 — 
 
195 61.5 23.0 50.4 55.2 52.8 73.3 
    
          
  WORLD 0.450 — 
 
145 47.4 21.1 54.1 64.2 50.6 76.7 
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Table A5. Personal remittances 2009-13, received (current US dollars).  
Country  
Population  
2009-2013, in mln 
(average annual) 
Remittances  
2009-13, in  
mln USD (average 
annual) 
Remittances per 
capita 2009-13, in 
USD (annual 
average)  
Aruba 0.10 4.86 47.59 
Andorra 0.08 - - 
Afghanistan 29.12 223.08 7.66 
Angola 20.19 3.68 0.18 
Albania 2.83 1086.23 383.95 
United Arab Emirates 8.73 - - 
Argentina 40.73 611.72 15.02 
Armenia 2.97 1803.08 607.45 
American Samoa 0.06 - - 
Antigua and Barbuda 0.09 16.34 185.38 
Australia 22.38 1772.61 79.19 
Austria 8.41 2761.28 328.22 
Azerbaijan 9.18 1656.27 180.47 
Burundi 9.54 30.93 3.24 
Belgium 11.02 10563.34 958.77 
Benin 9.78 87.47 8.94 
Burkina Faso 16.01 43.27 2.70 
Bangladesh 152.96 9512.31 62.19 
Bulgaria 7.35 1504.75 204.68 
Bahrain 1.28 - - 
Bahamas, The 0.37 - - 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 3.84 1929.00 502.29 
Belarus 9.48 834.50 88.03 
Belize 0.32 76.48 241.73 
Bermuda 0.07 1010.34 15536.65 
Bolivia 10.33 834.33 80.78 
Brazil 196.93 2712.32 13.77 
Barbados 0.28 39.27 139.34 
Brunei Darussalam 0.41 - - 
Bhutan 0.73 10.71 14.68 
Botswana 1.99 15.25 7.68 
Central African Republic 4.44 - - 
Canada 34.38 1189.95 34.61 
Switzerland 7.91 2957.72 373.83 
Channel Islands 0.16 - - 
Chile 17.31 0.94 0.05 
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China 1344.23 34973.16 26.02 
Cote d'Ivoire 19.42 137.71 7.09 
Cameroon 21.17 145.78 6.89 
Congo, Rep. 4.22 - - 
Colombia 47.07 4079.04 86.66 
Comoros 0.70 - - 
Cabo Verde 0.49 157.42 320.32 
Costa Rica 4.74 544.34 114.91 
Cuba 11.28 - - 
Curacao 0.15 12.89 85.76 
Cayman Islands 0.06 - - 
Cyprus 1.12 117.76 105.50 
Czech Republic 10.49 2080.67 198.36 
Germany 81.30 13999.34 172.18 
Djibouti 0.85 26.15 30.87 
Dominica 0.07 18.22 254.97 
Denmark 5.57 1237.68 222.23 
Dominican Republic 10.15 4058.00 399.97 
Algeria 37.78 152.93 4.05 
Ecuador 15.25 2095.57 137.44 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 79.40 10632.68 133.91 
Euro area 333.33 60662.13 181.99 
Eritrea 5.94 - - 
Spain 46.62 9443.24 202.57 
Estonia 1.33 372.70 280.52 
Ethiopia 89.43 348.87 3.90 
Finland 5.39 881.16 163.52 
Fiji 0.87 139.20 160.49 
France 65.35 20527.21 314.09 
Faeroe Islands 0.05 88.71 1790.61 
Micronesia, Fed. Sts. 0.10 - - 
Gabon 1.59 - - 
United Kingdom 63.22 1761.81 27.87 
Georgia 4.46 1511.73 338.73 
Ghana 24.81 107.97 4.35 
Guinea 11.17 45.82 4.10 
Gambia, The 1.74 88.88 51.17 
Guinea-Bissau 1.63 18.95 11.65 
Equatorial Guinea 0.72 - - 
Greece 11.12 1238.34 111.38 
Grenada 0.11 22.89 217.79 
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Greenland 0.06 - - 
Guatemala 14.72 4635.23 314.94 
Guam 0.16 - - 
Guyana 0.79 367.91 465.34 
Hong Kong SAR, China 7.08 353.13 49.86 
Honduras 7.78 2792.44 358.91 
Croatia 4.33 1329.83 307.15 
Haiti 10.04 1558.81 155.30 
Hungary 9.96 2193.98 220.23 
Indonesia 243.74 5569.03 22.85 
Isle of Man 0.08 - - 
India 1221.15 46800.69 38.33 
Ireland 4.57 681.06 149.00 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 75.46 716.53 9.50 
Iraq 31.78 164.54 5.18 
Iceland 0.32 20.52 64.15 
Israel 7.77 624.56 80.39 
Italy 59.42 6678.88 112.39 
Jamaica 2.70 2065.58 765.32 
Jordan 6.18 3496.51 565.43 
Japan 127.55 2062.83 16.17 
Kazakhstan 16.56 196.40 11.86 
Kenya 42.06 692.98 16.48 
Kyrgyz Republic 5.53 1197.65 216.40 
Cambodia 14.62 142.16 9.72 
Kiribati 0.10 - - 
St. Kitts and Nevis 0.05 35.13 663.23 
Korea, Rep. 49.72 6279.16 126.29 
Kosovo 1.79 1070.93 597.67 
Kuwait 3.12 3.43 1.10 
Lao PDR 6.52 49.63 7.61 
Lebanon 4.37 5660.75 1294.59 
Liberia 4.07 83.31 20.48 
Libya 6.09 - - 
St. Lucia 0.18 23.25 129.89 
Liechtenstein 0.04 - - 
Sri Lanka 20.56 5006.92 243.57 
Lesotho 2.03 472.28 232.55 
Lithuania 3.05 1687.44 553.90 
Luxembourg 0.52 1702.69 3277.89 
Latvia 2.07 678.40 327.84 
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Macao SAR, China 0.55 45.47 83.41 
St. Martin (French part) 0.03 - - 
Morocco 32.10 5291.18 164.83 
Monaco 0.04 0.00 0.00 
Moldova 3.56 1582.61 444.40 
Madagascar 21.69 - - 
Maldives 0.33 2.76 8.32 
Mexico 119.37 22767.43 190.73 
Marshall Islands 0.05 - - 
Macedonia, FYR 2.10 394.68 187.60 
Mali 14.42 342.12 23.72 
Malta 0.42 38.76 92.91 
Myanmar 52.38 59.28 1.13 
Montenegro 0.62 328.90 530.04 
Mongolia 2.75 213.13 77.36 
Northern Mariana Islands 0.05 - - 
Mozambique 24.59 125.35 5.10 
Mauritania 3.70 - - 
Mauritius 1.29 0.69 0.54 
Malawi 15.46 18.41 1.19 
Malaysia 28.76 1232.18 42.85 
Namibia 2.22 8.81 3.97 
New Caledonia 0.25 399.73 1574.24 
Niger 16.54 47.20 2.85 
Nigeria 164.35 15887.67 96.67 
Nicaragua 5.91 921.26 155.92 
Netherlands 16.68 1670.32 100.14 
Norway 4.95 726.88 146.70 
Nepal 27.16 4203.16 154.73 
New Zealand 4.40 469.03 106.63 
Oman 3.09 31.21 10.11 
Pakistan 176.14 11860.38 67.33 
Panama 3.74 390.20 104.33 
Peru 29.64 2085.51 70.37 
Philippines 95.10 23175.82 243.71 
Palau 0.02 - - 
Papua New Guinea 7.01 7.89 1.13 
Poland 38.39 7445.80 193.97 
Puerto Rico 3.68 - - 
Korea, Dem. Rep. 24.63 - - 
Portugal 10.53 3824.58 363.05 
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Paraguay 6.57 510.60 77.67 
Qatar 1.89 390.26 206.62 
Romania 20.16 3967.60 196.80 
Russian Federation 142.79 5799.38 40.62 
Rwanda 11.15 111.15 9.97 
South Asia 1628.15 72290.98 44.40 
Saudi Arabia 27.79 241.86 8.70 
Sudan 36.42 752.46 20.66 
Senegal 13.35 888.40 66.57 
Singapore 5.19 - - 
Solomon Islands 0.54 4.65 8.64 
Sierra Leone 5.87 39.98 6.82 
El Salvador 6.26 3679.89 587.92 
San Marino 0.03 - - 
Somalia 9.92 - - 
Serbia 7.24 2663.32 367.77 
South Sudan 10.40 - - 
Sao Tome and Principe 0.18 4.32 23.59 
Suriname 0.53 5.57 10.51 
Slovak Republic 5.40 1802.91 333.90 
Slovenia 2.05 499.13 243.27 
Sweden 9.45 877.01 92.83 
Swaziland 1.21 43.52 35.91 
Sint Maarten (Dutch part) 0.04 4.77 122.81 
Seychelles 0.09 15.29 172.93 
Syria, Arab Republic 21.95 594.48 27.08 
Turks and Caicos Islands 0.03 - - 
Chad 12.09 - - 
Togo 6.48 134.22 20.72 
Thailand 66.61 4262.73 64.00 
Tajikistan 7.82 2147.87 274.62 
Turkmenistan 5.11 - - 
Timor-Leste 1.11 79.91 71.82 
Tonga 0.10 55.50 531.16 
Trinidad and Tobago 1.33 65.25 48.97 
Tunisia 10.67 1659.60 155.61 
Turkey 73.07 1012.80 13.86 
Tuvalu 0.01 - - 
Tanzania 46.40 48.13 1.04 
Uganda 35.18 655.69 18.64 
Ukraine 45.74 7682.80 167.96 
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Uruguay 3.38 80.84 23.89 
United States 311.54 6136.40 19.70 
Uzbekistan 29.14 - - 
St. Vincent and the Grenadines 0.11 23.40 214.05 
Venezuela, RB 29.50 106.00 3.59 
Virgin Islands (U.S.) 0.11 0.00 0.00 
Vietnam 87.86 4576.00 52.09 
Vanuatu 0.24 13.41 55.47 
West Bank and Gaza 3.93 1286.55 327.25 
Samoa 0.19 107.91 575.56 
Yemen, Rep. 23.31 817.98 35.09 
South Africa 51.59 1029.07 19.95 
Congo, Dem. Rep. 63.97 32.40 0.51 
Zambia 13.66 40.82 2.99 
Zimbabwe 13.44 - - 
COUNTRY INCOME GROUPS  
High income 99853.73 77.23 
Upper middle income 92160.65 38.85 
Middle income 238707.43 49.13 
Lower middle income 146546.79 58.94 
Low & middle income 257883.46 45.47 
Low income 19176.03 23.60 
REGIONS  
East Asia & Pacific (developing only) 60057.43 30.37 
East Asia & Pacific (all income levels) 70739.34 31.88 
Europe & Central Asia (developing 
only) 28215.53 105.07 
Europe & Central Asia (all income 
levels) 109352.17 122.53 
Latin America & Caribbean 
(developing only) 45864.83 79.79 
Latin America & Caribbean (all income 
levels) 46125.06 76.65 
Middle East & North Africa 
(developing only) 29443.74 88.19 
Middle East & North Africa (all income 
levels) 30445.76 78.48 
North America 6772.93 19.58 
Sub-Saharan Africa (all income levels) 22010.96 24.77 
Sub-Saharan Africa (developing only) 22010.96 24.79 
WORLD  357737.19 51.37 
